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I. Introduction
Investment theory is the study of the individual behavior of house-
holds and economic organizations in the allocation of their resources to
the available investment opportunities. For the purposes of investment
theory, economic organizations are characterized as being members of one of
two groups: "business firms" that hold as assets the physical means of
production for the economy and finance their production decisions by issu-
ing financial claims or securities; and "financial intermediaries" that
hold financial claims as assets and finance these assets by issuing se-
curities. Individuals or households are assumed to invest primarily in se-
curities, and therefore invest only indirectly in physical assets. The mar-
kets in which these securities are traded are called the capital markets.
The natural starting point for the development of investment theory is
to derive the investment behavior of individuals. It is traditional in
economic theory to take the existence of households and their tastes as exo-
geneous to the theory. However, this tradition does not extend to economic
organizations and institutions. They are regarded as existing primarily be-
cause of the functions they serve instead of functioning primarily because
they exist. Economic organizations are endogeneous to the theory. To derive
the functions of these economic organizations, therefore, the investment
behavior of individuals must be derived first.
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It is convenient to break the investment decision by individuals into
two parts: (1) the "consumption-saving" choice where the individual decides
how much of his wealth to allocate to current consumption and how much to
invest for future consumption; and (2) the "portfolio selection" choice where
he decides how to allocate his savings among the available investment oppor-
tunities. In general, the two decisions cannot be made independently. How-
ever, the format of the paper is to, first, solve the portfolio selection
problem taking individual's consumption decisions and firms' production de-
cisions as given, and to derive necessary conditions for financial equilibrium.
Second, using these necessary conditions, the optimal production decision rules
for firms are derived. Finally, the combined consumption and portfolio selec-
tion problem for individuals is solved.
If is, of course, not possible in a single paper to cover all the topics
important to investment theory. However, two topics not covered here warrant
special mention. First, while some necessary conditions for equilibrium are
derived, I have not attempted to integrate these conditions into a general
equilibrium theory for the economy. Second, no attempt has been made to make
explicit how individuals and firms acquire the information needed to make
their decisions, and in particular how they modify their behavior in envir-
onments where there are significant differences in the information available
/to various participants.
to various participants.-
Ill
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II. One-Period Portfolio Selection
The basic investment choice problem for an individual is to determine
the optimal allocation of his wealth among the available investment oppor-
tunities. The solution to the general problem of choosing the best invest-
ment mix is called portfolio selection theory. I begin the study of
portfolio selection theory with its classic one-period formulation.
There are n different investment opportunities called securities and
the random variable one-period return per dollar on security j is denoted
by Zj (j=l, ..., n) where a "dollar" is the "unit of account." Any linear
combination of these securities which has a positive market value is called
a portfolio. It is assumed that the investor chooses at the beginning of
a period that feasible portfolio allocation which maximizes the expected
2/
value of a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functionrr- for end-of-period
wealth. I denote this utility function by U(W).where W is the end-of-period
value of the investor's wealth measured in dollars. It is further assumed
that U is an increasing strictly concave function on the range of feasible values for
W and that U is twice-continuously differentiable.-- / Because the criterion
function for choice depends only on the distribution of end-of-period wealth,
the only information about the securities that is relevant to the investor's
decision is his subjective joint probability distribution for (Z1, '... Zn).
In addition, it is assumed that:
(A.1) ("Frictionless" markets) There are no transactions costs or taxes, and
all securities are perfectly divisible.
(A.2) ("Price Taker") The investor believes that his actions cannot affect
the probability distribution of returns on the available securities.
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Hence, if w. is the fraction of the investor's initial wealth, W , allocated
to security j, then {w1, ..., wn} uniquely determines the probability dis-
tribution of his terminal wealth.
A "riskless security" is defined to be a security or feasible portfolio
of securities whose return per dollar over the period is known with certainty.
(A.3) ("No-Arbitrage Opportunities") All riskless securities must have the
same return per dollar. This common return will be denoted by R.
(A.4) ("No-Institutional" Restrictions) Short-sales of all securities,
with full use of proceeds, is allowed without restriction. If there
exists a riskless security, then the borrowing rate equals the
4/
lending rate. 4
Hence, the only restriction on the choice for the {w} is the budget constraint
that En = 1.
Given these assumptions, the portfolio selection problem can be formally
stated as
(II.1) Max E{U( 1 wjZjWo)}
{Wl,.. ,w}
subject to w = 1 where "E" is the expectation operator for the subjective
joint probability distribution. If (wl ,.., wn ) is a solution to (II.1),
then it will satisfy the first-order conditions
(II.2) E{U'(Z W);} , j = 1, 2, ..., n
n *
where the prime denotes derivative; Z 1 W zj is the random variable
return per dollar on the optimal portfolio; and X is the Lagrange multiplier
III
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for the budget constraint. Together with the concavity assumptions on U,
if the nxn variance-covariance matrix of the returns (Z1, ... Z n) is non-
singular, then there exists a unique interior solution. This condition on
the returns distribution eliminates "redundant" securities (i.e., securities
whose returns can be expressed as exact linear combinations of the returns
on other available securities). / It also rules out that any one of the
securities is a riskless security.
If a riskless security is added to the menu of available securities
(call it the (n+l)s t security), then it is the convention to express (II.1)
as the following unconstrained maximization problem:
(II.3) Max E{U([Z=1 wj(Zj - R) + R]W )}
{W.,... ,wn}
where the portfolio allocations to the risky securities are unconstrained because
the fraction allocated to the riskless security can always be chosen to satisfy
* n *
the budget constraint. (I.e., Wn+ = 1 - 1 w.). The first-order conditions
can be written as
(11.4) E{U'(Z W )(Zj - R)} = 0 j = 1, 2, ... , n
where Z can be rewritten as Z1 wj (Zj - R) + R. Again, if it is assumed
that the variance-covariance matrix of the returns on the risky securities is
nonsingular, then there exists a unique interior solution.
In both (II.1) or (II.3), no explicit consideration has been given
for the treatment of bankruptcy (i.e., Z < 0). To rule out bankruptcy,
the additional constraint that the probability of Z > 0 be one could be
* * 6 / f the reason for this on-imposed on the choices for (w , .., wn ).- If the reason for this con-
straint is to reflect institutional restrictions designed to avoid individual
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bankruptcy, then it is too weak because the probability assessments on the
{Z.} are subjective. A more-realistic treatment would be to forbid borrow-
ing and short-selling in conjunction with limited-liability securities
where, by law, Z. > 0. These rules can be formalized as restrictions on
the allowable set of {w.} such that wj > 0, j = 1, 2, ..., n+l, and (II.1)
7/or (II.3) can be solved using the methods of Kuhn and Tucker-- for inequality
constraints. However, since the creation of limited-liability securities is
itself a bankruptcy rule and only one of many that might be proposed, such
explicit restrictions will not be imposed. Rather, it
is simply assumed that there exists a bankruptcy law which allows for U(W) to
be defined for W < 0 and that this law is consistent with the continuity
and concavity assumptions on U.
The optimal demand functions for risky securities, {wjW0}, and the
resulting probability distribution for the optimal portfolio will, of course,
depend on the risk preferences of the investor, his initial wealth, and the
joint distribution for the securities' returns. It is well-known that
the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function can only be determined up to
8/
a positive affine transformation.8 Hence, the preference orderings of
all choices available to the investor are completely specified by the Pratt-
9/
Arrow-- absolute risk-aversion function which can be written as
-U" (W)(II.5) A(W) -U'(W) 
and the change in absolute risk-averson with respect to a change in wealth is,
therefore, given by
dA A U"' (W)1.6) dA = A' (W) = A(W)[A(W) + ]
dW U"(W)
By the assumption that U(W) is increasing and strictly concave, A(W) is positive, and
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such investors are called risk-averse. An alternative, but related, measure of
risk-aversion is the relative risk-aversion function defined to be
(II.7) (W) - U(W)W = A(W)W,
and its change with respect to a change in wealth is given by
(II.8) 6' (W) = A' (W)W + A(W)
The certainty equivalent end-of-period wealth, W, associated with a
given portfolio for end-of-period wealth whose random variable value is
denoted by W, is defined to be that value such that
(II.9) U(Wc) = E{U(W)}
I.e., W is the amount of money such that the investor is indifferent between
having this amount of money for certain or the portfolio with random variable
outcome W. The term "risk-averse" as applied to investors with concave
utility functions is descriptive in the sense that the certainty equivalent
end-of-period wealth is always less than the expected value of the associated
portfolio, E{W}, for all such investors. The proof follows directly by
Jensen's Inequality. Namely, if U is strictly concave, then
u(Wc) = E{U(W)} < U(E{W})
whenever W has positive dispersion, and because U is a nondecreasing function
of W, W < E{W}
c
The certainty-equivalent can be used to compare the risk-aversions of
two investors. An investor is said to be more risk-averse than a second
investor if for every portfolio, the certainty-equivalent end-of-period
wealth for the first investor is less than or equal to the certainty equivalent
-8-
end-of-period wealth associated with the same portfolio for the second
investor with strict inequality holding for at least one portfolio.
While the certainty equivalent provides a natural definition for
10 /
comparing risk-aversions across investors, Rothschild and Stiglitz--
have attempted in a corresponding fashion to define the meaning of "increa-
sing risk" for a security so that the "riskiness" of two securities or port-
folios can be compared. In comparing two portfolios with the same expected
values, the first portfolio with random variable outcome denoted by W1 is
said to be less risky than the second portfolio with random variable outcome
denoted by W2 if
(II.10) E{U(W1)} > E{U(W2 )}
for all concave U with strict inequality holding for some concave U. They
bolster their argument for this definition by showing its equivalence to
the following two other definitions:
(II.11) There exists a random variable Z such that W2 has the
same distribution as W1 + Z where the conditional ex-
pectation of Z given the outcome on W 1 is zero. (I.e.,
W2 is equal in distribution to W1 plus some "noise.")
(II.12) If the points of F and G, the distribution functions of
W1 and W2, are confined to the closed interval [a,b],
and T(y) f [F(x) - G(x)]dx, then T(y) > 0 and
a
T(b) = 0. (I.e., W2 has more "weight in its tails"
than W1 .)
A feasible portfolio with return per dollar Z will be called an
tefficient portfolio if there exists an increasing, strictly concave function
V such that E{V'(Z)(Zj - R)} = 0, 1, 2, ..., n. Using the Rothschild-j
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Stiglitz definition of "less risky," a feasible portfolio will be an effi-
cient portfolio only if there does not exist another feasible portfolio
which is less risky than it is. All portfolios that are not efficient are
called inefficient portfolios.
Proposition II.1. If the set of available securities contain no
redundant securities, then no two efficient portfolios have the
same risk in the Rothschild-Stiglitz sense.
1 2
Proof: Let Ze1 and Ze denote the random variable returns per dollar on
two distinct efficient portfolios. Let "E" denote the expectation
operator over their joint distribution. The proof goes by contradic-
tion. If the two portfolios have the same risk, then E(Ze) = E(Z )
and E{U(Ze )}= E{U(Ze )} for every concave U. Consider the following
artificial security with return per dollar Z given by Z = YZe +
(1 - Y)Z where Y = 1 with probability 6 (O < 6 < 1) and Y = 0 with
e
1 2
probability (1 - 6)of Z and Z . It followse e
that Ez(Z) = E(Ze ) = E(Ze ) and Ez{U(Z)} = 6E{U(Ze )}+ (1 - 6)E{U(Ze 2 )}
2 1
= E{U(Z = E{U(e )}. I.e., Z has the same risk as either Ze or
Ze . Define Z Ey(Z) = 6Z1 + (1 6)Z . By the independence of
Y and Jensen's Inequality, E{U(Z6)} > Ez{U(Z)} with equality holding
if and only if Z = Z because U can be taken to be strictly concave.
If the inequality holds, then Z6 is less risky than Z because E(Z6)
= Ez(Z). But Z6 is the random variable return on a feasible portfolio
1 2
gotten by combining the two portfolios Ze and Z with portfolioe e
1 2
weights [6, (1 - 6)]. Hence, Z6 is less risky than both Ze and Ze
But, this contradicts the hypothesis that these portfolios are efficient.
1 2
Hence, Z = Z6, and this is possible if and only if Ze = Ze If
1 2
there are no redundant securities, then Z = Z if and only if thee e
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two portfolios contain identical holdings, but this contradicts the
hypothesis that the two portfolios are distinct.
Hence, from the definition of an efficient portfolio and Proposition
II.1, it follows that no two portfolios in the efficient set can be ordered
with respect to one another. From (II.10), it follows immediately that
every efficient portfolio is a possible optimal portfolio. I.e., for each
efficient portfolio, there exists an increasing, concave U and an initial
wealth W0 such that the efficient portfolio is a solution to (II.1) or (II.3).
Further, from (II.10), all risk-averse investors will be indifferent between
selecting their optimal portfolios from the set of all feasible portfolios
or from the set of efficient portfolios. Hence, without loss of generality,
I will assume that all optimal portfolios are efficient portfolios.
With these general definitions established, I now turn to the analysis
of the optimal demand functions for risky assets and their implications
for the distributional characteristics of the underlying securities. A
note on notation: the symbol "Z " will be used to denote the random variable
e
return per dollar on an efficient portfolio, and a bar over a random variable
(e.g., Z) will denote the expected value of that random variable.
Theorem II.1. If Z denotes the random variable return per dollar
on any feasible portfolio and if (Ze - Ze) is riskier than (Z - Z)
in the Rothschild and Stiglitz sense, then Z > Z.
Proof: By hypothesis, E{U([Z - Z]W0)} > E{U([Z e -Ze]W 0)} If Z - Ze then
trivially, E{U(ZWo)} > E{U(ZeWo)} . But, Z is a feasible portfolio
and Z is an efficient portfolio. Hence, by contradiction, Z > Z.
e e
Corollary II.l.a. If there exists a riskless security with return
R, then Ze> R with equality holding only if Z is a riskless security.
e -- e
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Proof: The riskless security is a feasible portfolio with expected return
R. If Z is riskless, then by assumption (A.3), Ze = R. If Ze is not
riskless, then (Ze - Z e) is riskier than (R - R). Therefore, by Theorem
II.1, Ze > R.
Theorem II.2. The optimal portfolio for a nonsatiated, risk-averse
* *
investor will be the riskless security (i.e., w+ 1 = 1, w. = 0,
n+l J
j = 1, 2, ..., n) if and only if Z = R for j = 1, 2, ..., n.
Proof: From (II.4), { 1, ... , wn } will satisfy E{U'(Z W)(Zj - R)} = 0,
_ 
*
j = 1, 2, ..., n. If Z. = R, j = 1, 2, ..., n, then Z = R will
satisfy these first-order conditions. By the strict concavity of U
and the nonsingularity of the variance-covariance matrix of returns,
this solution is unique. This proves the "if" part. If Z = R is
an optimal solution, then we can rewrite (II.4) as U'(RWo)E(Zj - R) = 0.
By the nonsatiation assumption, U'(RWO) > 0. Therefore, for Z = R
to be an optimal solution, Z = R, j = 1, 2, ..., n. This proves
the "only if" part.
Hence, from Corollary II.l.a and Theorem II.2, if a risk-averse investor
chooses a risky portfolio, then the expected return on that portfolio exceeds
the riskless rate, and a risk-averse investor will choose a risky portfolio if,
at least, one available security has an expected return different from the
riskless rate.
Define the notation E(YIX 1, ..., X ) to mean the conditional expectation
of the random variable Y, conditional on knowing the realizations for the ran-
dom variables (X1, ..., Xq).
- 12 -
Theorem II.3. If there exists a feasible portfolio with return Zp
such that for security s, Zs Zp + es where E() = E( Zp Zj
j=l, ..., n, js) = 0, then the fraction of every efficient portfolio
allocated to security s is the same and equal to zero.
Proof: The proof follows by contradiction. Let Z be the return on an
efficient portfolio with fraction 6 0O allocated to security s.
Let Z be the return on a portfolio with the same fractional holdings
as Ze except instead of security s, it holds the fraction 6 in fea-
sible portfolio Zp. Hence, Z = Z + 6 (Zs - Z) or Z = Z + 6 s p e 5 s p e s s
By hypothesis, Ze = Z and by construction, E(e sZ) = 0. Therefore,
for 6 0, Z is riskier than Z in the Rothschild-Stiglitz sense.
But, this contradicts the hypothesis that Z is an efficient portfolio.
Hence, 6 = 0 for every efficient portfolio.
Corollary II.3.a. Let , denote the set of n securities with returns
(Z1 ... , Z s-1, Z Zs+l, ... Zn) and 4' denote the same set of
securities except Zs is replaced with Zs,. If Z , = Z + s and
E( s) = E(C Z1, ... , Zs-1 , Zs Zs+1, . Zn) = 0, then all risk
averse investors would prefer to choose their optimal portfolios from
j rather than '.
The proof is essentially the same as the proof of Theorem II.3 with "Z "
replacing "Z ". Unless the holdings of Z in every efficient portfolio isp s
zero, will be strictly preferred to 4'.
Theorem II.3 and its corollary demonstrate that all risk averse inves-
tors would prefer any "unnecessary" uncertainty or "noise" to be eliminated.
In particular, by this theorem the existence of lotteries is shown to be
inconsistent with strict risk aversion on 11 /
inconsistent with strict risk aversion on the part of all investors.
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While the inconsistency of strict risk-aversion with observed behavior such
as betting on the numbers can be "explained" by treating lotteries as consumption
goods, it is difficult to use this argument to explain other implicit lotteries
such as callable, sinking fund bonds where the bonds to be redeemed are selected
at random.
As illustrated by the partitioning of the feasible portfolio set into its
efficient and inefficient parts and the derived theorems, the Rothschild-
Stiglitz definition of increasing risk is quite useful for studying the properties
of optimal portfolios. However, it is important to emphasize that these
theorems apply only to efficient portfolios and not to individual securities
or inefficient portfolios. For example, if (Zj - Zj) is riskier than (Z - Z)
in the Rothschild-Stiglitz sense and if security j is held in positive amounts
in an efficient or optimal portfolio (i.e., w. > 0), then it does not follow
3
that Z must equal or exceed Z. In particular, if wj > 0, it does not follow
that Zj must equal or exceed R. Hence, to know that one security is riskier
than a second security using the Rothschild-Stiglitz definition of increasing
risk provides no normative restrictions on holdings of either security in an
efficient portfolio. And because this definition of riskier imposes no
restrictions on the optimal demands, it cannot be used to derive properties
of individual securities' return distributions from observing their relative
holdings in an efficient portfolio. To derive these properties, a second
definition of risk is required. However, discussion of this measure is
delayed until Section III.
In closing this section, comparative statics results are derived for
the optimal risky security demand in the special case of a single risky secur-
ity and a riskless security (i.e., n=l). Additional results for the general
case of many risky securities can be found in Fisher [22].
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Define K by
(II.13) K - -E{U"(W )(Z - R) 2W} > 0
where Z is the random variable return per dollar on the single risky security
and W - [w (Z - R) + R]W is the random variable end-of-period wealth for
the optimal allocation.
Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to (II.4), the change in the
proportion of the optimal portfolio allocated to the risky security with res-
pect to a change in initial wealth can be written as
* * * *
w -E{w(W )U' (W )(W - RW )} *
aw o
(II.14) W * 2 for w 0
o (wW) K
0
=0 for w = 0,
whered is the relative risk-aversion function defined in (II.7). If U
is such that L is a constant, then aw */aw = 0 because E{U'(W* )(W - RW = 0 0
from (II.4). By integrating (II.7) twice, the general class of concave utility
functions that exhibit constant relative risk aversion can be written as
(11.15) U(W) = C1 WY - + C2
where C1 and C2 are any constants such that C1 > 0 and y < 1. Because
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions are unique only up to a positive
affine transformation, all distinct members of this class are determined by
the single parameter y. The relative risk-aversion function, , equals
(1 - y) > O. Hence, for investors with utility functions in this class, a
larger value of y implies a smaller value of relative risk aversion. Moreover,
12/
for all portfolios that can be ranked,- it is straightforward to show that
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aw /ay > 0.
For each possible outcome for W , we have by the Mean Value Theorem that
*
there exists a number e = e(W ), 0 < < 1, such that
(II.16) (W*) = t(RWo) + R' () (W - RW o)
where nq RW + (W - RW ) and R' is defined in (II.8). Substituting from
0 0
(II.16) into (II.14) with w 0, (II.14) can be rewritten as
*k · k 2
*k - E{Wa(n)U' (W)(W - RW )2I
aw o(II.17) * 2
o (*W) K
From (II.17), a sufficient condition for the optimal proportion in the risky
security to decline with an increase in initial wealth is that R'w > 0.
Similarly, a sufficient condition for the optimal proportion to increase is
*
that PR'w < 0. Hence, for investors with strictly increasing (decreasing)
relative risk aversion, an increase in initial wealth will induce a decrease
(increase) in the absolute proportion of the optimal portfolio allocated to
the risky security, w .
From II.14, the change in the dollar allocation to the risky security in
the optimal portfolio with respect to a change in initial wealth can be written
as
a( Wo) - RE{w A(W )U'(W )(W - RW)} *
(II.18) aw ° , w 0
o 2(w ) K
0 w =0
where A is the absolute risk-aversion function defined in (II.5). If U is
such that A is a constant, then a(w Wo)/aW = 0. By integrating (II.5) twice,
the general class of concave utility functions that exhibit constant absolute
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risk-aversion can be written as
(II.19) U(W) = C2 - Cle"
where C1 and C2 are any constants such that C1 > 0 and p > O0. All distinct
members of this class are determined by the single parameter p which is equal
to the absolute risk-aversion function, and a(w Wo)/a u < 0.
Again, using the Mean Value Theorem, A(W ) can be written as
(II.20) A(W A(RWo) + A' ()(W - RW ).
Substituting from (II.20) into (II.18) with w # 0, (II.18) can be rewritten as
a(wW ) -RE{wA' ()U'(W )(W - RW )2}0 o(11.21) aw = 
o (w ) K
From (II.21), a sufficient condition for the optimal dollar investment in the
risky security to decline is that A'w > 0, and a sufficient condition for it
to increase is that A'w < 0. Hence, for investors with strictly increasing
(decreasing) absolute risk aversion, an increase in initial wealth will induce
a decrease (increase) in the absolute dollar position in the risky security,
Jw*woIW
Although the direction of change in both the proportional and absolute
dollar holdings of the risky security depends upon the sign of w , the sign of
w is determined solely by the sign of (Z - R). From Theorem II.2, w = 0
if and only if Z = R. If w # 0, then Z > R because an optimal portfolio is
an efficient portfolio. But Z = R + w (Z - R). Hence, w (Z - R) > 0 if
w $ 0. Therefore, for any nonsatiated, risk-averse investor, the sign of w
will equal the sign of (Z - R). Warning: this condition need not obtain
with respect to an individual security when there is more than one risky
- 17 -
security. I.e., the sign of w need not equal the sign of (Zj - R) for n > 1.
From (II.14), the change in w with respect to a change in the risky
security's expected return, Z, can be written as
aw* E{U'(W )[1 - A(W*XW RW )I}
(II.22) =
Kaz
Inspection of (11.22) shows that the sign of aw /az is ambiguous. However,
* _
three sufficient conditions for 3w /Z to be positive are:
(II.23) (i) w = 0;
or
(ii) A'(W) = 0;
or
(iii) ( - RW for RW < W < WW - RW o
o
where W+ equals the maximum possible outcome for W . Conditions (i) and (iii)
follow directly from (II.22) and (ii) follows from the substitution for A(W )
from (II.20) into (II.22).
From (II.14),. the change in w with respect to a change in R can be
written as
*aw(11.2 aR (w* 2From (II.24), w /aR can be either positive or negative. Two sufficient
conditions for aw /aR to be negative are:
(11.25) (i) A'W 0 and w (1 - w ) = 0
or
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(ii) A'(W) 0 and w (1 - w ) - 0.
These conditions follow from the substitution for A(W ) from (II.20) into (II.24).
Rothschild and Stiglitz / have examined the effect on the optimal
demand for the risky security of an increase in that security's riskiness.
As with the other comparative statics results derived here, they found that
the change in the optimal demand can be either positive or negative. A
sufficient condition for an increase in risk to decrease the demand for the
risky security is that f(Z) (Z - R)U'([w (Z - R) + R]W o) be concave in Z.
It is straightforward to show by differentiating f(Z) twice with respect to Z that
if relative risk aversion is less than or equal to R and nondecreasing and if
absolute risk aversion is nonincreasing, then f(Z) is strictly concave for
w > 0 and strictly convex for w < 0.
In summary, even for the simplest case of one risky security and a
riskless security, the sign of the change in the optimal demand for the risky
security with respect to changes in its probability distribution is consistently
ambiguous unless restrictions are placed on the class of utility functions or
on the class of probability distributions for Z.
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cov[V'(Ze),Ze] < 0.14/ It is understood that in the following discussion
"efficient portfolio" will mean "efficient portfolio with positive dispersion."
Let Z denote the random variable return per dollar on any feasible portfolio p.
p
Definition. The measure of risk of portfolio p relative to efficient
portfolio K with random variable return ZKe bK , is defined by
bK cov[Y(Ze) Z p]p e p
and portfolio p is said to be riskier than portfolio p' relative to
efficient portfolio K if bK > b, .
P P
Theorem III.1. If Z is the return on a feasible portfolio p and ZK
P e
is the return on efficient portfolio K, then Z - R = b (Z - R).
P P e
Proof: From the definition of V(Ze), E{V'(ZeK)(Zj - R)} = 0, j = 1, 2, ..., n.
Let 6 be the fraction of portfolio p allocated to security j. Then,
= 1n 6(Zj - R) + R, and 6jE{V'(Z e)(Zj - R)} = E{V'(Z)(Z - R)} = 0.p .1 J e e p
By a similar argument, E{V'(Z)(Z - R)} = 0. Hence, cov[V'(ZK), Ze] =
(R- )E{V'(ZK)} and cov[V'(Ze), Z] = (R - Z )E{V'(Z)} . By
Corollary II.l.a, > R. Therefore, cov[Y(ZK ), Zp] = - (R - Z .
e e p (R zp, e
Hence, the expected excess return on portfolio p, Zp - R, is in direct propor-
tion to its risk, and because > R, the larger is its risk, the larger is
e
its expected return. Thus, Theorem III.1 provides the first argument why bK
is a natural measure of risk for individual securities.
A second argument goes as follows: consider an investor with utility
function U and initial wealth W0 who solves the portfolio selection problem
Max E{U([wZj + (1 - w)Z]W0)}
w
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III. Risk Measures for Securities and Portfolios in the One-Period Model
In the previous section, the Rothschild-Stiglitz measure for the risk
of a security was defined, and the comparative statics of an increase in
a security's risk was analyzed in the special case of a single risky securi-
ty and a riskless security. However, in the more-than-one risky security
portfolio problem, the Rothschild-Stiglitz measure is not a natural definition
of risk for a security. In this section, a second definition of increasing
risk is introduced, and it is argued that this second measure is a more
appropriate definition for the risk of a security. Although this second
measure will not in general provide the same orderings as the Rothschild-
Stiglitz measure, it is further argued that the two measures are not in
conflict, and indeed, are complementary.
If Z is the random variable return per dollar on an efficient portfolio
e
with positive dispersion, then let V(Ze) denote an increasing, strictly concave
function such that
E{V'(Z e ) (z j - R)} 0, j 1, 2, .... , n.
I.e., V is a concave utility function such that an investor with initial wealth
Wo = 1 and these preferences would select this efficient portfolio as his
optimal portfolio. While such a function V will always exist, itwill not
be unique. If cov(xl, x2) is the functional notation for the covariance
between the random variables x and x2, then define the random variable,
Y(Ze), by
V'(Ze) - E{V'(Z e)}
(Il.1) Y(Z )
e Cov[V'(Z ),Ze]
Y(Z ) is well-defined as long as Z has positive dispersion because
e e
III
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K
ordering while the b-measure provides a complete ordering. Moreover,
they can give different rankings. For example, suppose the return on security
j is independent of the return on efficient portfolio K, then b = 0 and
KZj = R. Trivially, bR = 0 for the riskless security. Therefore, by the
b.-measure, security j and the riskless security have equal risk. However,
if security j is not riskless, then by the Rothschild-Stiglitz measure,
security j is more risky than the riskless security. Despite this, the two
measures are not in conflict, and indeed, are complementary. The Rothschild-
Stiglitz definition measures the "total risk" of a security in the sense that
it compares the expected utility from holding a security alone with the
expected utility from holding another security alone. Hence, it is the
appropriate definition for identifying optimal portfolios and determining
the efficient portfolio set. However, it is not useful for defining the risk
of securities generally because it does not take into account that investors
can mix securities together to form portfolios. The b-measure does take
this into account because it measures the only part of an individual security's
risk which is relevant to an investor: namely, the part that contributes
to the total risk of his optimal portfolio. In contrast to the Rothschild-
Stiglitz measure of total risk, the b measures the "systematic risk" of a
security (relative to efficient portfolio K). Of course, to determine
K
the b, the efficient portfolio set must be determined. Because the Rothschild-
Stiglitz measure does just that, the two measures are complementary.
Other properties of the bK measure of systematic risk are:
(P.1) If a feasible portfolio p has portfolio weights (61, 62' ' 6n),
K n Kthen b = E1 ibj . The systematic risk of a portfolio is the weighted
sum of the systematic risks of its component securities.
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where Z is the return on a portfolio of securities and Z is the return on
the security j. The optimal mix, w , will satisfy the first-order condition
(III.2) E{U'([w*Z. + (1 - w )Z]W)(Zj - Z)} = 0.
If the original portfolio of securities chosen was this investor's optimal
portfolio (i.e., Z = Z ), then the solution to (III.2) is w = 0. However,
an optimal portfolio is an efficient portfolio. Therefore, by Theorem III.1,
* -*
Zj - R = b(Z - R). Hence, the "risk-return tradeoff" provided in Theorem
III.1 is a condition for personal portfolio equilibrium. Indeed, because
security j may be contained in the optimal portfolio, w W0 is similar to an
excess demand function. b. measures the contribution of security j to the
Rothschild-Stiglitz risk of the optimal portfolio in the sense that the
investor is just indifferent to a marginal change in the holdings of security
j provided that Z. - R = bz - R). Moreover, by the Implicit Function
Theorem, we have from (III.2) that
3) w w*WoE{U"(- Z)} - E{U'}
(III.3) aw
azj E{U"(Z - Zj) 2
> O at w =0.
Therefore, if Z lies above the "risk-return" line in the (Z - b ) plane,
then the investor would prefer to increase his holdings in security j and
if Z lies below the line, then he would prefer to reduce his holdings. If
the risk of a security increases, then the risk-averse investor must be
"compensated" by a corresponding increase in that security's expected return
if his current holdings are to remain unchanged.
The Rothschild-Stiglitz measure of risk is clearly different from the
b.-measure here. The Rothschild-Stiglitz measure provides only for a partial
J
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(P.1) follows directly from the linearity of the covariance operator,
Cov[x1, x2], with respect to the random variable x2.
Let p and p' denote any two feasible portfolios and let K and L denote
any two efficient portfolios.
K L(P.2) If b = 0 for some efficient portfolio K, then b = 0 for any efficient
P P
portfolio L.
(P.2) follows from Theorem III.1 and Corollary II.l.a. If bK = 0, then
-K B -L L
Z = R because Z > R. But if Z = R and Z > R, then b = 0.
p e p e p
K > K L > L(P.3) b = b, if and only if b b
K K K(P.3) follows from (P.2) if b = bp, = O. Suppose b 0, then (P.3)
follows from Theorem (III.1) because
K -
Zb , - R ,
p = P = 
K Lb Z -R b
P P P
(P.3) provides a third argument why bK is a natural measure of risk for
p
individual securities. Namely, the ordering of securities by their systematic
risk relative to a given efficient portfolio will be identical to their
ordering relative to any other efficient portfolio. Hence, given the set
of available securities, there is an unambiguous meaning to the statement
"security j is riskier than security i."
(P.4) If portfolio p is an efficient portfolio (call it the K one with
Z = Z ), then for any efficient portfolio L, b > 0 and in particular,p e p
b = 1. Hence, all efficient portfolios have positive systematic
p
risk relative to any efficient portfolio.
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(P.4) follows from Theorem (III.1) and Corollary II.l.a.
(P.5) If the systematic risk of portfolio p is defined by its expected
return, Z, and if portfolio p is said to be riskier than portfolio
p' if and only if Z > Z ,, then this measure of systematic risk is
equivalent to the bK measure.
P
(P.5) follows directly from Theorem (III.1), Corollary II.l.a, and (P.3).
Although the expected return of a security provides an equivalent ranking
K K
to its b measure, the bK measure is not vacuous. There exist nontrivial
P P
information sets which allow b to be determined without knowledge of Z .
For example, consider a model in which all investors agree on the joint dis-
tribution of the returns on securities. Suppose one knows the probability
distribution of the optimal portfolio, Z W, and the utility function U for
some investor. From (III.1), one, therefore, knows the distribution of Y(Z ).
For security j, define the random variable ej Zj - Zj. Suppose further
that one has enough information about the joint distribution of Y(Z ) and
* -15 /
¢j to compute Cov[Y(Z ), sj], but does not know Z..- By the definition
of covariance, Cov[Y(Z ), ] = Cov[Y(Z ), Zj] = b . However, Theorem III.1
is a necessary condition for equilibrium in the securities market. Hence,
one can deduce the equilibrium expected return on security j from Z. =
R + bj(Z - R). An analysis of the necessary information sets required
to deduce the equilibrium structure of security returns is an important part
of portfolio theory,and further discussion of this topic is provided in
Sections IV and V.
III
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IV. Spanning, Separation and Mutual Fund Theorems
Definition A set of M feasible portfolios with random variable
returns (XI,...,X) are said to span the space of portfolios
contained in set ' if and only if for any portfolio in with
return denoted by Zp, there exists numbers (1 .,), ZiMj = 1,
such that Z = M jX. If N is the number of securities available
p 1 j ·
to generate the portfolios in ' and if M* denotes the smallest
number of feasible portfolios that span the space of portfolios
contained in , then M* - N.
As was illustrated in section II, very little can be derived about the
structure of optimal portfolio demand functions unless further restrictions
are imposed on the class of investors' utility functions or the class of
probability distributions for securities' returns. A particularly fruit-
ful set of such restrictions is the one that provides for a nontrivial
(i.e., M*<N) spanning of the feasible portfolio set. Indeed, the spanning
property leads to a collection of "mutual fund" or "separation" theorems
that are the core of modern financial theory.
A mutual fund is a financial intermediary that holds as its assets a
portfolio of securities and issues as liabilities shares against these
assets. Unlike the portfolio of an individual investor, the portfolio of
securities held by a mutual fund need not be an efficient portfolio.. The
connection between mutual funds and the spanning property can be seen in
the following theorem:
Theorem IV.1 If there exists M mutual funds whose portfolios span
the portfolio set , then all investors will be indifferent between
selecting their optimal portfolios from or from portfolio combin-
ations of just the M mutual funds.
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The proof of the theorem follows directly from the definition of spanning.
If Z* denotes the return on an optimal portfolio selected from and if
X. denotes the return on the jth mutual fund's portfolio, then there exist
J
* * * Mportfolio weights (61,..' 6M) such that Z = l Xj. Hence, any investor
would be indifferent between the portfolio with return Z and the (61..,6M)
combination of the mutual fund shares.
Although the theorem states "indifference," if there are information-
gathering or other transactions costs and if there are economies of scale,
then investors would prefer the mutual funds whenever M<N. By a similar
argument, one would expect that investors would prefer to have the smallest
number of funds necessary to span . Therefore, the smallest number of
such funds, M , is a particularlyimportant spanning set. Hence, the span-
ning property can be used to derive an endogenous theory for the existence
of financial intermediaries with the functional characteristics of a mutual
fund. Moreover, from these functional characteristics, a theory for their
optimal management can be derived.
For the mutual fund theorems to have serious empirical content, the
minimum number of funds required for spanning, M , must be significantly
smaller than the number of available securities, N. When such spanning
obtains, the investor's portfolio selection problem can be separated into
two steps: first, individual securities are mixed together to form the M
mutual funds; second, the investor allocates his wealth among the M funds'
shares. If the investor knows that the funds span the space of optimal
portfolios, then he need only know the joint distribution of (X1,..., X*)
to determine his optimal portfolio. It is for this reason that the mutual
fund theorems are also called "separation" theorems. However, if the M
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funds can be constructed only if the fund managers know the preferences,
endowments, and probability beliefs of each investor, then the formal
separation property will have little operational significance.
In addition to providing an endogenous theory for mutual funds, the
existence of a nontrivial spanning set can be used to deduce equilibrium
properties of individual securities' returns and to derive optimal decision
rules for' business firms making physical investments. Moreover, in vir-
tually every model of portfolio selection in which empirical implications
beyond those presented in sections II and III are derived, some nontrivial
form of the spanning property obtains.
While the determination of conditions under which nontrivial spanning
will obtain is in a broad sense a subset of the traditional economic theory
of aggregation, the first rigorous contributions in portfolio theory were
made by Arrow [2 ], Markowitz [491, and Tobin [89]. In each of these papers
and most subsequent papers, the spanning property is derived as an implica-
tion of the specific model examined, and therefore, such derivations provide
only sufficient conditions. In two notable exceptions, Cass and Stiglitz [7]
and Ross [72] "reverse" the process by deriving necessary conditions'for
nontrivial spanning to obtain. In this section, necessary and sufficient
conditions for spanning are developed along the lines of Cass and Stiglitz
and Ross, leaving until Section V discussion of the specific models of
Arrow, Markowitz, and Tobin.
Let Tf denote the set of all feasible portfolios that can be con-
structed from a riskless security with return R and n risky securities with
a given joint probability distribution for their random variable returns
(Z ,...,Z). Let denote the nxn variance-covariance matrix of the returns
on the n risky assets.
1_1111111_ --
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Theorem IV.2 Necessary conditions for the M feasible portfolios
with returns (X1 ,...,X M) to span the portfolio set f are (i) that
the rank of M and (ii) that there exists numbers (61 ,., 6M),
ZElj = 1 such that the random variable jX. has zero variance.
Proof:
(i) the set of portfolio f defines a (n+l) dimensional vector space.
f
By definition, if (X1,...,XM) spans , then each risky security's
return can be represented as a linear combination of (X1,...,XM).
Clearly, this is only possible if the rank of Q < M. (ii) The risk-
less security is contained in . Therefore, if (X1,...,XM) spans ,
then there must exist a portfolio combination of (X1,...,X) which is
riskless.
Proposition IV.1 If Z = ZlajZj + b is the return on some securityp ljj
or portfolio and if there are no "arbitrage opportunities" (Assumption
(A.3)), then (1) b = [1- n ]R and (2) Z = R + En (Z -R).laj p laj j
Proof:
Let Z be the return on a portfolio with fraction 6t allocated to
security j, j=1,2,...,n; 6 allocated to the security with return Zp;p p
(1-6 p-16j) allocated to the riskless security with return R. If J
is chosen such that 6 = -6 a., then Z - R + 6 (b-R[1-naj]). Z± is
t
a riskless security, and therefore, by (A.3), Z= R. But, 6 can beP
chosen arbitrarily. Therefore, b = [l-EZla]R. Substituting for b,
n
it follows directly that Zp = R + Zlaj(Zj-R).
As long as there are no arbitrage opportunities, from Theorem IV.2 and
Proposition IV.1, without loss of generality, it can be assumed that one
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of the portfolios in any candidate spanning set is the riskless security.
If by convention, XM = R, then in all subsequent analyses, the notation
(X1,...,Xm,R) will be used to denote a M-portfolio spanning set where
m M-1 is the number of risky portfolios (together with the riskless secur-
ity) that span f.
Theorem IV.3 A necessary and sufficient condition for (X1,...,X ,R)
to span 'f is that there exist numbers (aij) such that Z = R +
laij(i-R), j=1,2,...,n.
Proof:
If (X1 ,...,Xm,R) span T'f, then there exists portfolio weights (6lj. '6mj)
6ij = 1, such that Z = i jXi . Noting that XM = R and substituting
6Mj = 1- Z6j' we have that Zj = R + ij(Xi-R). This proves1 ij'j ij i
necessity. If there exists numbers (aij) such that Z = R + aij (Xi-R),
then pick the portfolio weights 6ij = aj for i=l,...,n, and
6Mj = 1 - 6ij from which it follows that Zj = E16ijXi. But every
portfolio in yf can be written as a portfolio combination of (Zl,..,Z)
and R. Hence, (X1,...,X ,R) spans 'yf and this proves sufficiency.
Let QX be the mxm variance-covariance matrix of the returns on the m port-
folios with returns (X1,...,X)
Corollary IV.3a A necessary and sufficient condition for (X,..,X R)
to be the smallest number of feasible portfolios that span
(i.e., M = m+l) is that the rank of equals the rank of X = m.
Proof:
If (X1 ,..,Xm,R) span f and m is the smallest number of risky portfo-
lios that does, then (X1,..,XM) must be linearly independent, and
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therefore, rank QX = m. Hence, (X1,..,Xm) form a basis for the vec-
tor space of security returns (Z1,..,Z). Therefore, the rank of Q
must equal QX' This proves necessity. If the rank of QX = m, then
(X1,..,X ) are linearly independent. Moreover, (X1,..,X ) . Hence,
if the rank of Q = m, then there exists numbers (aij) such that
- = im mZ- Z = ai (X -Xi) for j=1,2,...,n. Therefore, Z = b + Ea Xi
where b Zj - a X By the same argument used to prove Proposi-j j 1 i
tion IV.1, b = [1-lai]R. Therefore, Z = R + a (X -R). By
Theorem IV.3, (X1,..,Xm,R) span Tf.
If follows from Corollary IV.3.a, that a necessary and sufficient
condition for nontrivial spanning of f is that some of the risky securi-
ties are redundant securities. Note, however that this condition is suffi-
cient only if securities are priced such that there are no arbitrage
opportunities.
In all these derived theorems, the only restriction on investors'
preferences was that they prefer more to less. In particular, it was not
assumed that investors are necessarily risk averse. Although Yf was
defined in terms of a known joint probability distribution for (Z1,..,Z )
which implies homogeneous beliefs among investors, inspection of the proof
of Theorem IV.3 shows that this condition can be weakened. If investors
agree on a set of portfolios (X1, .,X ,R) such that Z = R + Eia (X
j=1,2,...,n, and if they agree on the numbers (aij), then by Theorem IV.3,
(X1,..,Xm,R) span f even if investors do not agree on the joint distribu-
tion of (X1,..,X ). These appear to be the weakest restrictions on
preferences and probability beliefs that can produce nontrivial
spanning and the corresponding mutual fund theorem. Hence, to derive
additional theorems, it is assumed that all investors
III
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are risk-averse and that investors have homogeneous probability beliefs.
Define e to be the set of all efficient portfolios contained in f.
Proposition IV.2 If Z is the return on a portfolio contained in
e
Te, then any portfolio that combines positive amounts of Ze with
the riskless security is also contained in Te.
Proof:
Let Z = 6(Ze-R) + R be the return on a portfolio with positive frac-
tion 6 allocated to Ze and fraction (1-6) allocated to the riskless
security. Because Ze is an efficient portfolio, there exists a
strictly concave, increasing function V such that E{V'(Ze)(Zj-R)} = 0,
j=1,2,..,n. Define U(W) - V(aW+b) where a - 1/6 > 0 and b - (6-1)R/6.
Because a > 0, U is a strictly concave and increasing function. More-
over, U'(Z) = aV'(Ze). Hence, E{U'(Z)(Zj-R)} = O, j=1,2,..,n. There-
fore, there exists a utility function such that Z is an optimal port-
folio, and Z is, therefore, an efficient portfolio.
Hence, from Proposition IV.2, if (X1,..,XM) are the returns on M portfolios
that are candidates to span the space of efficient portfolios Ye, then
without loss of generality, it can be assumed that one of the portfolios is
the riskless security.
Theorem IV.4 If (X1,..,X ,R) span e and if Z. = Z. + . wherej J J
E(cj) = E(Ej|X,..,X m) = 0, then Z = R.
Proof:
By hypothesis, (X1 ,..,Xm,R) span Ye and therefore, for each efficient
k kportfolio, Z , there exists portfolio weights such that Z = R +
e e
EM6k(Xi-R). Hence, E(ej I) = 0 for every efficient portfolio.l ii ije
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Therefore, the systematic risk of security j with respect to efficient
portfolio k, b = 0. By Theorem III.1, Z. = R.
J J
Hence, by Theorem IV.4, if inequilibrium, the total source of variation in
a security's return is noise relative to a set of portfolios that span Te,
then risk averse investors will be willing to hold the total quantity of
that security outstanding even though they are not "compensated" by a posi-
tive expected excess return. Moreover, Theorem IV.4 suggests that the
equilibrium expected return on a security will depend upon the joint distri-
bution of its return with the set of spanning portfolios.
Theorem IV.5 If (X1 ,..,X ,R) span Te and if there exists numbers
- m m
(aij) such that Z_ = Z + Elai (Xi-Xi) + ej where E(ej) = E(Ej[
X X ) - 0, then Z = R+ m iM3 J 1aij (Xi-R)
Proof:
Let Z be the return on a portfolio with fraction 6. allocated to
portfolio Xi, i=l,...,m; 6 allocated to security j, and 1-6-Z16t
allocated to the riskless security. If 6ft is chosen such that
6i -6ai, then Z = R + 6[Zj- R - Zlai(X -R)] + 6e. By Theorem1  ij 1 J,
IV.4, Z = R. But 6 can be chosen arbitrarily. Therefore,
Zj= R + Elij iixi-R).
Hence, if the return on a security can be written in a linear form
relative to the spanning portfolios (X1,..,Xm,R), then its expected excess
return is completely determined by the expected excess returns on the
spanning portfolios and the weights aij.
The following theorem first proved by Ross [72] shows that security
returns can always be written in this linear form relative to a set of
Ill
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spanning portfolios.
Theorem IV.6 A necessary and sufficient condition for (X1,..,Xm,R)
to span the set of efficient portfolios Te is that there exists
numbers (aij) such that for j=l,...,n, Zj = R + ai (Xi-R) + cj1 ij i j
where E(ej) E(sjX 1 ,..,X) = O.
Proof:
The proof of sufficiency is straightforward. Let Zp be the return on
a feasible portfolio with fraction 6 invested in security j,
j=1,2,..,n and 1 - n6 invested in the riskless security. Then
Zp = R + E6j(Z-R). By hypothesis, Zp can be rewritten as Zp = R +
Eld6 (X -R) + p where 6i 6 ai and - E6 e. Consider thel i i i j ij p l J
feasible portfolio with return Zp' constructed by allocating fraction
6i to portfolio Xi and fraction 1 - 6i to the riskless security. Byi li
construction, Zp = Z' + sp where E(s ) = E(p IZp ) = O. Hence, for
£p O0, Zp is riskier than Z,' in the Rothschild-Stiglitz sense, and
hence, Zp cannot be an efficient portfolio. Therefore, all efficient
portfolios can be generated by a portfolio combination of (Xl,..,XmR).
The proof of necessity is not presented here because it is long and
not constructive. The interested reader can find the proof in Ross [72]-.
Since ye is contained in f, any properties proved for portfolios that span
e f
Te must be properties of portfolios that span f . From Theorems IV.3 and
IV.6, the essential difference is that to span the efficient portfolio set,
it is not necessary that linear combinations of the spanning portfolios
exactly replicate the return on each available security. Hence, it is not
necessary that there exist redundant securities for nontrivial spanning of
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ye to obtain. Of course, both theorems are empty of any empirical content
if the size of the smallest spanning set, M , is equal to (n+l).
As discussed in the introduction to this section, all the important
models of portfolio selection exhibit the nontrivial spanning property for
the efficient portfolio set. For all such models that do not restrict the
class of admissible utility functions beyond that of risk aversion, the
distribution of individual security returns must be such that Z. = R +
Ema. (Xi-R) + where E(cjIX,..,X ) = 0 for j=l,...,n. Moreover, given
some knowledge of the joint distribution of a set of portfolios that span
ewih_
Ve with (Zj-Zj), there exists a method for determining the aij and Z..
Proposition IV.3 If (X1 ,..X ,R) span e with (X1,..,X ) linearly
independent with finite variances and if the return on security j,
Zj, has a finite variance, then the (aij), i=1,2,..,m in Theorem
IV.6 are given by the formula, i=1,2,...,m
aij IlvikCov[X, Zj]
th -l
where vik is the i-k- element of 1
The proof of Proposition IV.3 follows directly from the condition that
E(Ejl Xk) = 0 which implies that Cov[ej,Xk] = O, k=l,...,m. The condition
that (X ,..,Xm) be linearly independent is trivial in the sense that know-
ing the joint distribution of a spanning set, one can always choose a lin-
early independent subset. The only properties of the joint distributions
required to compute the aij are the variances and covariances of the
X1, ...X and the covariances between Zj and X1,..,X . In particular, know-
ledge of Z is not required because Cov[X,Zj] = Cov[Xk,Z-Zj]. Hence, for
m<n (and especially so, for m<<n), there exists a nontrivial information
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set which allows the aij to be determined without knowledge of Z.. If
X1,..,X are known, then Zj can be computed by the formula in Theorem IV.5.
m i
By comparison with the example at the end of section III, the information
set required there to determine Z was a utility function and the joint
distribution of its associated optimal portfolio with (Zj-Zj). Here, one
must know a complete set of portfolios that span e. However, only the
second-moment properties of the joint distribution are required, and no
utility function information other than risk aversion is required.
A special case of no little interest is when a single risky portfolio
and the riskless security span the space of efficient portfolios. Indeed,
the classic model of Markowitz and Tobin which is discussed in section V
exhibits this strong form of separation. Moreover, most macroeconomic
models have highly-aggregated financial sectors where investors' portfolio
choices are limited to simple combinations of two securities: "bonds" and
"stocks." The rigorous microeconomic foundation for such aggregation is
precisely that e is spanned by a single risky portfolio and the riskless
security.
If X denotes the random variable return on a risky portfolio such
that (X,R) spans 'e, then the return on any efficient portfolio, Ze, can be
written as if it had been chosen by combining the risky portfolio with
return X with the riskless security: Namely, Ze = 6(X-R) + R where 6 is
the fraction allocated to the risky portfolio and (1-6) is the fraction
allocated to the riskless security. By Corollary II.l.a, the sign of 6 will
be the same for every efficient portfolio, and therefore, all efficient
portfolios will be perfectly positively correlated. If X>R, then by Pro-
position IV.2, X will be an efficient portfolio and 6>0 for every efficient
portfolio.
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Proposition IV.4 If (Z1,..,Z ) contain no redundant securities
and if 6 denotes the fraction of portfolio X allocated to secur-
ity j, and w denotes the fraction of any risk-averse investor's
J
optimal portfolio allocated to security j, j=l,...,n, then for
every such risk-averse investor,
w 6.
j = I , k= 1,2,..,n.
wk 6k
The proof follows immediately because every optimal portfolio is an effi-
cient portfolio, and the holdings of risky securities in every efficient
portfolio are proportional to the holdings in X. Hence, the relative hold-
ings of risky securities will be the same for all risk averse investors.
Whenever Proposition IV.4 holds and if there exists numbers 6. such that
/6* = 6j/ 6 j, k=l,...,n and Cn = 16 , then the portfolio with propor-
tions (61,..,6n) is called the Optimal Combination of Risky Assets. If
such a portfolio exists, then without loss of generality, it can always be
n *
assumed that X = E16 ZJ
Proposition IV.5 If (X,R) spans ve, then e is a convex set.
Proof:
1 2
Let Z and Z denote the returns on two distinct efficient portfolios.
e e
Because (X,R) spans e, Z1 = 61 (X-R) + R and Z =6 2(X-R) + R. Be-e 1 e 2
cause they are distinct, 6 62' and so, assume 6 1 0 Let Z Z1
+ (-X)Z 2 denote the return on a portfolio which allocates fraction
e
X to Z1 and (l-X) to Ze2 where 0 < X < 1. By substitution, the expres-
e e
1 6
sion for Z can be rewritten as Z = 6(Z -R) + R where 6 [X+ 2 (1-X)].
1 2 e 1Because Z and Z are efficient portfolios, the sign of 61 is the same
e O. Therefore, by Proposition IV.2, Z
as the sign of 62. Hence, 6 > 0. Therefore, by Proposition IV.2, Z
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is an efficient portfolio. It follows by induction that for any
integer k and numbers X. such that 0 < < 1, i=l,...,k and Z i 1,integer k andnume i
Zk 1 EiZ is the return on an efficient portfolio. Hence, Fe is a
convex set.
Definition A market portfolio is defined to be a portfolio that holds
all available securities in proportion to their market values. To
avoid the problems of "double counting" caused by financial interme-
diaries and inter-household issues of securities, the equilibrium mar-
ket value of a security for this purpose is defined to be the equili-
brium value of the aggregate demand by individuals for the security.
In models where all physical assets are held by business firms and busi-
ness firms hold no financial assets, an equivalent definition is that
the market value of a security equals the equilibrium value of the
aggregate amount of that security issued by business firms. If Vj
denotes the market value of security and VR denotes the value of the
riskless security, then
V
j=1,2,,..,n
vj R
where 6M is the fraction of security j held in a market portfolio.
Theorem IV.7 If Ye is a convex set, and if the securities' mar-
ket is in equilibrium, then a market portfolio is an efficient
portfolio.
Proof:
Let there be K risk-averse investors in the economy with the initial
wealth of investor k denoted by . Define Z R + lW(Zj-R) to
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be the return per dollar on investor k's optimal portfolio where w is
the fraction allocated to security . In equilibrium, ElW f = Vj,
K kw k
j=1,2,...,n and z E WO = E"j + V. Define Xk /W k=l,..,K.
K
Clearly, Sk < 1 and EZk = 1. By definition of a market portfolio,
Ew = 6 M j=1,2,...,n. Multiplying by (Zj-R) and summing over j,
K nk K knM
it follows that kElwj(Zj-R) = iXk(Zk-R) = E16j(Zj-R) = ZM - R
where ZM is defined to be the return per dollar on the market port-
folio. Because : k = 1, ZM = zk . But every optimal portfolio
is an efficient portfolio. Hence, ZM is a convex combination of the
returns on K efficient portfolios. Therefore, if e is convex, then
the market portfolio is contained in Ye.
Because a market portfolio can be constructed without the knowledge of
preferences, the distribution of wealth or the joint probability distribution
for the outstanding securities,models in which the market portfolio can be shown
to be efficient are more likely to produce testable hypotheses. In addition,
the efficiency of the market portfolio provides a rigorous microeconomic justi-
fication for the use of a "representative man" in aggregated economic models.
Moreover, it is currently fashionable in the real world to advise passive"
investment strategies that simply mix the market portfolio with the riskless
security. Provided that the market portfolio is efficient, by Proposition
IV.2, no investor following such strategies could ever be convicted of
"inefficiency." Unfortunately, necessary and sufficient conditions for the
market portfolio to be efficient have not as yet been derived.
However, even if the market portfolio were not efficient, it does have
the following important property:
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Proposition IV.6 In all portfolio models with homogeneous beliefs
and risk-averse investors, the equilibrium expected return on the
market portfolio exceeds the return on the riskless security.
The proof follows directly from the proof of Theorem IV.7 and Corollary II.l.a.
Clearly, ZM - R = Zl (Z -R). By Corollary II.l.a, > R for k=l,...,K,
with strict inequality holding if Zk is risky. But, k > 0 Hence, > R
if any risky securities are held by any investor. Note that using no infor-
mation other than market prices and quantities of securities outstanding,
the market portfolio (and combinations of the market portfolio and the risk-
less security) is the only risky portfolio where the sign of its equilibrium
expected excess return can always be predicted.
Returning to the special case where e is spanned by a single risky
portfolio and the riskless security, it follows immediately from Proposition
IV.5 and Theorem IV.7 that the market portfolio is efficient. Because all
efficient portfolios are perfectly positively correlated, it follows that
the risky spanning portfolio can always be chosen to be the market portfolio
(i.e., X = ZM). Therefore, every efficient portfolio (and hence, every op-
timal portfolio) can be represented as a simple portfolio combination of
the market portfolio and the riskless security with a positive fraction
allocated to the market portfolio. If all investors want to hold risky
securities in the same relative proportions, then the only way in which this
is possible is if these relative proportions are identical to those in the
market portfolio. Indeed, if there were one best investment strategy, and
if this "best" strategy were widely known, then whatever the original state-
ment of the strategy, it must lead to simply this imperative: hold the
market portfolio.
Ill
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Because for every security, 6 0, it follows from Proposition IV.4,
that in equilibrium, every investor will hold non-negative quantities of
risky securities, and therefore, it is never optimal to short sell risky
securities. Hence, in models where m=l, the introduction of restrictions
against short-sales will not affect the equilibrium.
Theorem IV.8 If (ZM,R) span 'e, then the equilibrium expected
return on security j, can be written as
Zj = R + j(ZM-R)
where . Cov[Zj,ZM1]
J Var(ZM)
The proof follows directly from Theorem IV.6 and Proposition IV.3. This
relationship, called the Security Market Line, was first derived by
Sharpe [84] as a necessary condition for equilibrium in the mean-variance
model of Markowitz and Tobin when investors have homogeneous beliefs. This
relationship has been central to the vast majority of empirical studies of
securities' returns published during the last decade. Indeed, the switch in
notation from "ai" to "Bj" in this special case reflects the almost univer-ij 
sal adoption of the term "the 'beta' of a security" to mean the covariance
of that security's return with the market portfolio divided by the variance
of the return on the market portfolio.
In the special case of Theorem IV.8, 8j measures the systematic risk
of security j relative to the efficient portfolio ZM (i.e., ij = bj as
defined in section III), and therefore, beta provides a complete ordering of
the risk of individual securities. As is often the case in research, useful
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concepts are derived in a special model first. The term "systematic risk"
was first coined by Sharpe and was measured by beta. The definition in
Section III is a natural generalization. Moreover, unlike the general risk
measure of Section III, j can be computed from a simple covariance between
Zj and ZM Securities whose returns are positively correlated with the mar-
ket are called "pro-cyclical," and will be priced to have positive equili-
brium expected excess returns. Securities whose returns are negatively
correlated are called "counter-cyclical," and will have negative equilibrium
expected excess returns. In general, the sign of b can not be determined
by the sign of the correlation coefficient between Z. and Z . However,
e
because Y(Z )/3Zk > 0 for each realization of Z , b. >-O does imply a
e e e 2
generalized positive "association" between the return on Z. and Z . Simi-
e
larly, b < 0, implies a negative "association."
Let .min denote the set of portfolios contained in Vf such that there
min
exists no other portfolio in Yf with the same expected return and a smaller
variance. Let Z(p) denote the return on a portfolio contained in min such
min
that Z(p) = , and let 6~ denote the fraction of this portfolio allocated to
security , j=l,...,n.
Theorem IV.9 If (Z ,...,Z ) contain no redundant securities,
then (a) for each value A, p6, j=l,...,n are unique; (b) there
exists a portfolio contained in min with return X such that
min
(X,R) spans min; (c) Z - R = a(X-R) where a _ Cov(Zj,X)/
Var(X), j=l,2,...,n.
Proof:
Let aij denote the i-j-th element of and because (Z1,...,Z n) contain
no redundant securities, Q is nonsingular. Hence, let v.i denote the
l0
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i-jth element of -1 . All portfolios in with expected return 
min
must have portfolio weights that are solutions to the problem: mini-
nn
mize nZ 16.6...i subject to the constraint Z(P) = . Trivially, if
= R, then Z(R) = R and 6. = 0, j=1,2,...,n. Consider the case when
pi R. The n first-order conditions are:
n1 ;6 i - ) (Zi-R), i=1,2,...,n
where i is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint. Multiplying
by and summing, we have that Xt = Var[Z(i)]/(p-R). By definition
of min. , must be the same for all Z(p). Because is nonsingular,
the set of linear equations has the unique solution
6= n Zlvij(Zi-R) i=l,2,..,n.
This proves (a). From this solution, 6/6k , j, k=l,2,...,n are the
same for every value of . Hence, all portfolios in Ymin with p R
are perfectly correlated. Hence, pick any portfolio in min with
P R and call its return X. Then every Z(P) can be written in the
form Z(p) = 6 (X-R) + R. Hence, (X,R) span Pmin which proves (b), and
from Theorem IV.6 and Proposition IV.3, (c) follows directly.
From Theorem IV.9, ak will be equivalent to bk as a measure of a
security's systematic risk provided that the Z(p) chosen for X is such that
p>R. Like k, the only information required to compute ak are the joint
second-moments of Zk and X. Which of the two equivalent measures will be
more useful obviously depends upon the information set that is available.
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However, as the following theorem demonstrates, the ak measure is the natural choice
in the case when there exists a spanning set for T. with m=l.
Theorem IV.10 If (X,R) span Ye and if X has a finite variance,
then Te is contained in min'
min
Proof:
Let Z be the return on any efficient portfolio. By Theorem IV.6, Ze
e
can be written as Ze R + a (X-R). Let Z be the return on any port-e p
folio in f such that Z = Z . By Theorem IV.6, Z can be written as
e p p
Z = R + a (X-R) + where E(sp) = E(p IX) = 0. Therefore, a = a
p p p p p p e
if Z = Z Var(Zp) = a2 Var(X) + Var(£p) > a2 Var(X) = Var(Ze).
p e p p p p e
eHence, Ze is contained in Tmin. Moreover, e will be the set of all
portfolios in min such that p> R.
Thus, whenever there exists a spanning set for e with m=l, the means, var-
iances, and covariances of (Zl,..,Z n) are sufficient statistics to completely
determine all efficient portfolios. Such a strong set of conclusions sug-
gests that the class of joint probability distributions for (Z1,..,Zn) which
admit a two-fund separation theorem will be highly specialized. However, as
the following theorems demonstrate, the class is not empty.
Theorem IV.11 If (Z ,..,Z ) have a joint normal probability dis-
tribution, then there exists a portfolio with return X such that
(X,R) span 'e.
Proof:
Using the procedure applied in the proof of Theorem IV.9, construct a
risky portfolio contained in min' and call its return X. Define the
random variables, k Zk - R - ak(X-R) k=l,...,n. By part (c) of
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that theorem, E(£k) = 0, and by construction, Cov[Ck,X] = 0. Because
Z1,.. ,Z are normally distributed, X will be normally distributed.
Hence, k is normally distributed, and because Cov[Ck,X] = 0, k and X
are independent. Therefore, E(sk) = E(EkIX) = O. From Theorem IV.6,
it follows that (X,R) spans .
It is straightforward to prove that if (Z1,..,Z ) can have arbitrary means,
variances, and covariances, then a necessary condition for there to exist a
portfolio with return X such that (X,R) span Fe is that (Z1,. ,Z ) be joint
normally distributed. However, it is important to emphasize the word "arbi-
trary." For example, the joint probability density function, p(Zl,..,Z n) is
called a symmetric function if for each set of admissible outcomes for
(Z1,..,Z), P(Z1,..,Zn ) remains unchanged when any two arguments of p are
interchanged.
Theorem IV.12 If p(Z,.. ,Z ) is a symmetric function with respect
to all its arguments, then there exists a portfolio with return X
such that (X,R) spans .
Proof:
By hypothesis, p(Z1,..,Zi,..,Z) = p(Zi ,Z1 ,..Zn) for each set of
given values (Z1,.,Z ). Therefore, from the first-order conditions
n
for portfolio selection, (II.4), every risk averse investor will choose
* *
w1 = w i. But, this is true for i=l,..,n. Hence, all investors will
hold all risky securities in the same relative proportions. Therefore,
if X is the return on a portfolio with an equal dollar investment in
each risky security, then (X,R) will span 'e
Samuelson [77] was the first to examine this class of density functions in a
portfolio context. An obvious example of such a joint distribution is when
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Z1,..,Z are independently and identically distributed which implies that
p(Z1,..,Z n) is of the form p(Z1)... ((Z ).
A second example comes from the Linear-Factor model developed by
Ross [71]. Suppose the returns on securities are generated by
(IV.) Z Z + iji j j=l,...,n
where E(Cs) = E(EjY 1 ..,Y) = 0 and without loss of generality, E(Yi) = O
and cov[Yi,Yj] = O, i j. The random variables {Yi} represent common fac-
tors that are likely to affect the returns on a significant number of secur-
ities. If it is possible to construct a set of m portfolios with returns
(X1,..,X ) such that Xi and Y. are perfectly correlated, i=1,2,...,m, then
the conditions of Theorem IV.6 will be satisfied and (X1,..,X ,R) will span ye.
Although, in general, it will not be possible to construct such a set,
by imposing some mild additional restrictions on {ej., Ross [71] has derived
an asymptotic spanning theorem as the number of available securities, n,
becomes large. While the rigorous derivation is rather tedious, a rough des-
cription goes as follows: Let Z be the return on a portfolio with fraction
p
6j allocated to security , j=1,2,..,n. From (IV.1), Zp can be written as
(IV.2) Z = Zp + ip i p
where Z = R + ZE6j(Zj-R); ai; cE E6jsj. Consider the set
p lj'j' ai 1j i p 1
of portfolios (called "well-diversified" portfolios) that have the property
6j uj/n, where ujl < M < - and M. is independent of n, j=l,...,n. Vir-
tually by the definition of a common factor, it is reasonable to assume that
for every n>>m, a significantly positive fraction of all securities, X i, have
- 46 -
aij $ 0, and this will be true for each common factor i, i=l,..,m. Similarly,
because the { } denotes the variations in securities' returns not explained
by common factors, it is also reasonable to assume for large n that for each
j, Ej is uncorrelated with virtually all other securities' returns. Hence,
if the number of common factors, m, is fixed, then it should be possible to
construct a set of well-diversified portfolios {Xk} such that for \, aik = 0,
i=l,..,m, ik and akk 0 for all n>>m. It follows from (IV.2), that ~ can be
written as
(IV.3) Xk X + akkYk + Zu j , k=l,...,m.
But lull is bounded, independently of n, and virtually all the ej are uncor-
related. Therefore, by the Law of Large Numbers, asn > , ->Xk + akkYk.
So, as n becomes very large, Xk and Yk become perfectly correlated, and by
Theorem IV.6, asymptotically, (X1,..,X,R) will span e. In particular, if
m=l, then asymptotically, two-fund separation will obtain independent of any
other distributional characteristics of Y1 or the {}.1 21
It is interesting to note that empirical studies of stock market
securities' returns have rarely found more than two or three statistically-
16!
significant common factors.- Given that there are tens of thousands of dif-
ferent corporate liabilities traded in U.S. securities markets, the assump-
tions used by Ross are not without some empirical foundation. Indeed, when-
ever nontrivial spanning of e obtains and the set of risky spanning port-
folios can be identified, much of the structure of individual securities
returns can be empirically estimated. For example, if (X1,..,X ,R) span e,
then by Theorem IV.6 and Proposition IV.3, Ordinary Least Squares Regression
of the realized excess returns on security j, Zj - R, on the realized excess
Ill
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returns of the spanning portfolios, (X-R,.., X -R), will always give unbi-
ased estimates of the aij. Of course, for these estimators to be efficient,
further restrictions on the {C. } are required to satisfy the Gauss-Markov
3
Theorem.
Although the analyses derived here have been expressed in terms of
restrictions on the joint distribution of security returns without explicitly
mentioning security prices, it is obvious that these derived restrictions
impose restrictions on prices through the identity that Z - V./V. where V.
is the random variable, end-of-period aggregate value of security j and Vj
is its initial value. Hence, given the characteristics of any two of these
variables, the characteristics of the third are uniquely determined. For the
study of equilibrium pricing, the usual format is to derive the equilibrium
Vjo, given the distribution of V..
Theorem IV.13 If (X1,..,Xm,R) spans TF , = m + , and all1 m
securities have finite variances, then a necessary condition for
equilibrium in the securities' market is that
V. E1 VikC°V[ XkV.](Xi-R)(IV.3) V, = j..,n
Jo R
th -1
where vik is the i-k h element of x
Proof:
Because M = m+l, nx is nonsingular. From the identity V _ Z V
and Theorem IV.6, V Vj [R + Caij(Xi-R) + j] where E(ejXl..,X )
m
= E(sj) = 0. Taking expectations V = Vjo[R + Elaij(Xi-R)]. Noting
that cov[ X,Vj] = Vjo Cov[Xk,Zj], we have from Proposition IV.3, that
Vjoaij = lv.ikCov[X,Vj]. By substituting for aij in the V expression
and rearranging terms, the theorem is proved.
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Hence, from Theorem IV.13, a sufficient set of information to determine the
equilibrium value of security j is the first and second moments for the
joint distribution of (X1,..,Xm,Vj). Moreover, the valuation formula has
the following important "linearity" properties:
Corollary IV.13.a If the hypothesized conditions of Theorem IV.13
hold and if the end-of-period value of some security is given by
V = nX V where are numbers, then in equilibrium,
V = n
o Xljjo'
The proof of the corollary follows by substitution for V in formula (IV.3).
This property of formula (IV.3) is called "value-additivity."
Corollary IV.13.b If the hypothesized conditions of Theorem IV.13
hold and if the end-of-period value of some security is given by
V qVj + u where E(u) = E(UIX1,..,Xm ) = u and E(q)= E(q|X1l..,XmV j)
= q, then in equilibrium,
V = qVjo + u/R
The proof follows by substitution for V in formula (IV.3) and by applying
the hypothesized conditional expectation conditions to show that Cov[X,V]
= q Cov[X,Vj]. Hence, to value two securities whose end-of-period values
differ only by multiplicative or additive "noise," one can simply substi-
tute the expected values of the noise terms. As will be shown later, both
corollaries are central to the theory of investment by business firms.
If nontrivial spanning of e is to obtain, the joint probability dis-
tribution for securities' returns cannot be arbitrary. How restrictive
these conditions are cannot be answered in the abstract. First, the
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introduction of general equilibrium pricing conditions on securities will
impose some restrictions on the joint distribution of returns. Second, the
discussed benefits to individuals from having a set of spanning mutual funds
may induce the creation of financial intermediaries or additional financial
securities which together with pre-existing securities will satisfy the
conditions of Theorem IV.6. An important example of the latter is the
Arrow model discussed in section V.
An alternative approach to the development of nontrivial spanning
theorems is to derive a class of utility functions for investors such that
for arbitrary joint probability distributions for the available securities,
investors within the class can generate their optimal portfolios from the
spanning portfolios. Let Tu denote the set of optimal portfolios selected
from yf by investors with strictly concave Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
functions Ui, Cass and Stiglitz [7] have proved the following theorem:
Theorem IV.14 There exists a portfolio with return X such that
(X,R) spans Tu if and only if A.(W) = /(a i+bW) > 0 where A. is
the absolute risk aversion function for investor i in u.17
The family of utility functions whose absolute risk aversion functions
can be written as l/(a+bW) > 0 is called the "HARA" (Hyperbolic Absolute
Risk Aversion) family.1 -/ By appropriate choices for a and b, various
members of the family will exhibit increasing, decreasing, or constant
absolute and relative risk aversion. Hence, if each investor's utility
function could be approximated by some member of the HARA family, then it
might appear that this alternative approach would be fruitful. However,
it should be emphasized that the "b" in the statement of Theorem IV.14
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does not have a subscript i, and therefore, for separation to obtain, all
investors in Tu must have virtually the same utility function. 9-- Moreover,
they must agree on the joint probability distribution for (Z...,Z).
Hence, the only significant way in which investors can differ is in their
endowments of initial wealth.
Cass and Stiglitz also examine the possibilities for general nontrivial
spanning (1 < m < n) by restricting the class of utility functions and con-
clude, "... it is the requirement that there be any mutual funds, and not
the limitation on the number of mutual funds which is the restrictive fea-
20/
ture of the property of separability. - Hence, the Cass and Stiglitz anal-
ysis is essentially a negative report on this approach to developing span-
ning theorems.
In closing this section, two further points should be made. First,
although virtually all the spanning theorems require the generally implaus-
ible assumption that all investors agree upon the joint probability distri-
bution for securities, it is not so unreasonable when applied to the theory
of financial intermediation and mutual fund management. In a world where
the economic concepts of "division of labor" and "comparative advantage"
have content, then it is quite reasonable to expect that an efficient allo-
cation of resources would lead to some individuals (the "fund managers")
gathering data and actively estimating the joint probability distributions
and the rest either buying this information directly or delegating their
investment decisions by "agreeing to agree" with the fund managers' estimates.
If the distribution of returns is such that nontrivial spanning of e does
not obtain, then there are no gains to financial intermediation over the
direct sale of the distribution estimates. However, if nontrivial spanning
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does obtain and the number of risky spanning portfolios, m, is small, then
a significant reduction in redundant information processing and transactions
can be produced by the introduction of mutual funds. If a significant co-
alition of individuals can agree upon a common source for the estimates and
if they know that, based on this source, a group of mutual funds offered
spans , then they need only be provided with the joint distribution for
these mutual funds to form their optimal portfolios. On the supply side,
if the characteristics of a set of spanning portfolios can be identified,
then the mutual fund managers will know how to structure the portfolios of
the funds they offer.
The second point concerns the riskless security. It has been assumed
throughout that there exists a riskless security. Although some of the
specifications will change slightly, virtually all the derived theorems can
be shown to be valid in the absence of a riskless security?1-1 However,
the existence of a riskless security vastly simplifies many of the proofs.
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V. Two Special Models of One-Period Portfolio Selection
The two most-cited models in the literature of portfolio selection are
the Time-State Preference model of Arrow [2] and Debreu [9] and the Mean-
Variance model of Markowitz [49] and Tobin [89]. Because these models have
been central to the development of the microeconomic theory of investment,
there are already many review and survey articles devoted just to each of
these models. 22/ Hence, only a cursory description of each model is pre-
sented here with specific emphasis on how each model fits within the frame-
work of the analyses presented in the other sections. Moreover, while,
under appropriate conditions, both models can be interpreted as multiperiod,
intertemporal portfolio selection models, such an interpretation will be
delayed until section.VII.
The structure of the Arrow-Debreu model is described as follows:
Consider an economy where all possible configurations for the economy at
the end of the period can be described in terms of M possible states of
nature. The states are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. It is assumed
that there are N risk averse individuals with initial wealth W and von
~k ~ o
Neumann Morgenstern utility function U (W) for investor k, k = 1, .. , N.
Each individual acts on the basis of subjective probabilities for the states
of nature denoted by k(8), =1,..,M; k=l,..,N. While these subjective
probabilities can differ across investors, it is assumed for each investor
that 0 < k(e) < 1, =l,..,M. As was assumed in section II, there are n
risky securities with returns per dollar Z and initial market value, V ,
j=l,..,n, and the "perfect market" assumptions of that section,
(A.1) - (A.4), are assumed here as well. Moreover,
if state obtains, then the return on security j will be Zj(0),
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and all investors agree on the functions Z(e), j=l,..,n; 0=l,..,M.
Because the set of states is exhaustive, [Zj(l),..,Zj(M)] describe all the
possible outcomes for the returns on security j. In addition, there are
available M "pure" securities with the properties that, i=l,..,M, one unit
(share) of pure security i will be worth $1 at the end of the period if
state i obtains and will be worthless if state i does not obtain. If P.
denotes the price per share of pure security i and if X. denotes its return
per dollar, then for i=l,..,M, Xi as a function of the states of nature,
can be written as Xi(e) = 1/Pi if 0=i and Xi(e) = 0 if 60i. All investors
agree on the functions {Xi(8)}, , 80=1,..,M.
Let Z = Z(N1,..,NM ) denote the return perdollar on a portfolio of pure
securities that holds N. shares of pure security j, j=l, .,M. If V (N ,.,N M )
ZN jP denotes the initial value of this portfolio, then the return per
dollar on the portfolio, as a function of the states of nature, can be
written as Z(8) = N0/Vo , =1,..,M.
Proposition V.1 There exists a riskless security, and its return
per dollar R equals 1/(ZPij).
Consider the pure-security portfolio that holds one share of each pure
security (Nj=l, j=l,..,M). The return per dollar, Z, is the same in every
state of nature.and equals 1/V (1,..,1) . Hence, there exists a riskless0
security and by (A.3), its return R is given by l/(ij).
Proposition V.2 For each security j with return Zj, there exists
a portfolio of pure securities whose return per dollar exactly
replicates Z.
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Proof:
Let Zj Z(Zj(1),..,Zj(M)) denote the return on a portfolio of pure
securities with N = Z(8), =l,..,M. It follows that V (Zj(l),..,Zj(M))
Z MiZj (i) and Zj(e) = Z (e)/V , =1,..,M. Consider a three-security
portfolio with return Z where fraction V is invested in ZJ; fraction
p 0
-1 is invested in Z; and fraction 1 - V - (-1) = (2-V ) is invested
in the riskless security. The return per dollar on this portfolio as
a function of the states of nature can be written as
Z () = (2-V )R +V`Zj(6) - Zj(e) = (2-V )R
which is the same for all states. Hence, Zp is a riskless security
and by (A.3), Z () = R. Therefore, V = 1, and Z (e) = Zj(e),
p 0 
0=1,..,M.
Proposition V.3 The set of pure securities with returns (X1,..,X)
spans the set of all feasible portfolios that can be constructed
from the M pure securities and the n other securities.
The proof follows immediately from Proposition V.1 and V.2. Hence, when-
ever a complete set of pure securities exists or can be constructed from
the available securities, then every feasible portfolio can be replicated by
a portfolio of pure securities. Models in which such a set of pure secur-
ities exists are called "complete markets" models in the sense that any
additional securities or markets would be redundant. Necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for such a set to be constructed from the available n
risky securities alone are that n > M; Assumption (A.3) holds; and the rank
of the variance-covariance matrix of returns, Q., equals M.
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The connection between the pure securities of the Arrow-Debreu model
and the mutual fund theorems of section IV are obvious. To put this model
in comparable form, we can choose the alternative spanning set (X1,..,X ,R)
where m = M-1. From Theorem IV.3, the returns on the risky securities can
be written as
(V.1) Z. = R + (XiR) j=l..,mj Zlij 1
where the numbers (aij) are given by Proposition IV.3
ij
Note that nowhere in the derivation were the subjective probability
assessments of the individual investors required. Hence, individual inves-
tors need not agree on the joint distribution for (X1,..,X ). However, by
Theorem IV.3, investors cannot have arbitrary beliefs in the sense that they
must agree on the (aij) in (V.1).
Proposition V.4 If Vj(e) denotes the end-of-period value of
security j if state obtains, then a necessary condition for
equilibrium in the securities' market is that
Vjo = v. (k) , jl,..,njo k j
The proof follows immediately from the proof of Proposition V.2. It was
shown there that V = E kZ (k) = 1. Multiplying both sides by Vo and
o kj jo
noting the identity Vj(k) VoZj(k), it follows that V = EM kV (k).Jo' Jo 1k j
However, by Theorem IV.3 and Proposition V.3, it follows that the {Vj }
can also be written as
-2) - Cov[k vj](X.-R)
(V.2) V.,
Jo R
.
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where vik is the i-kth element of QX1 Hence, from (V.2) and Proposition
V.4, if follows that the aij in (V.1) can be written as
(V.3) aij = [Zj(i)-R]/[l/Pi-R] , i=l,..,m; j=l,..,n.
From (V.3), given the prices of the securities, {P } and {Vj }, the {a }
will be agreed upon by all investors if and only if they agree upon the
{V.(i)} functions.
While it is commonly believed that the Arrow-Debreu model is completely
general with respect to assumptions about investors' beliefs, the assumption
that all investors agree on the {V.(i)} functions can impose nontrivial
restrictions on these beliefs. In particular, when there is production, it
will in general be inappropriate to define the states, tautologically, by
the end-of-period values of the securities, and therefore, investors will
23/
at least have to agree on the technologies specified for each firm-. How-
ever, as discussed in section IV, it is unlikely that a model without some
degree of homogeneity in beliefs (other than agreement on currently observed
variables) can produce testable restrictions. Among models that do produce
such testable restrictions, the assumptions about investors' beliefs in the
Arrow-Debreu model are probably the most general.
Finally, for the purposes of portfolio theory, the Arrow-Debreu model
is a special case of the spanning models of section IV which serves to
illustrate the generality of the linear structure of those models.
The most elementary type of portfolio selection model in which all
securities are not perfect substitutes is one where every portfolio can be
characterized by two numbers: its "risk" and its "return." The mean-
variance portfolio selection model of Markowitz [49] and Tobin [89] is such
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a model. In this model, each investor chooses his optimal portfolio so as
to maximize a utility function of the form, H[E(W), Var(W)], subject to his
budget constraint where W is his random variable end-of-period wealth. The
investor is said to be "risk-averse in a mean-variance sense" if H1 > 0;
H < 0; and HH - H2 > 0 where subscripts denote partial derivatives.H2 < 0; and HllH 22 H12
In an analogous fashion to the general definition of an efficient
portfolio in section II, a feasible portfolio will be called a mean-vari-
ance efficient portfolio if there exists a risk averse mean-variance util-
ity function such that this feasible portfolio would be preferred to all
other feasible portfolios. Let e denote the set of mean-variance effici-
my
ent portfolios. As defined in section IV, min is the set of feasible
portfolios such that there exists no other portfolio with the same expected
return and a smaller variance. For a given initial wealth W , every risk-
averse investor would prefer the portfolio with the smallest variance among
those portfolios with the same expected return. Hence, pe is contained
mv
in .
min
Proposition V.5 If (Z1,..,Z n) are the returns on the available
risky securities, then there exists a portfolio contained in
ev with return X such that (X,R) spans 'e and Zj R = a (X-R)
where aj Cov(Zj,X)/ Var(X), j=1,2,..,m.
24/
The proof follows immediately from theorem IV.9.-4/Hence, all the proper-
ties derived in the special case of two-fund spanning (m=l) in section IV
apply to the mean-variance model. Indeed, because all such investors would
prefer a higher expected return for the same variance of return, m y is the
set of all portfolios contained in min such that their expected returns
are equal to or exceed R. Hence, the mean-variance model is also a special
case of the spanning models developed in section IV.
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If investors have homogeneous beliefs, then the equilibrium version
25/
of the mean-variance model is called the Capital Asset Pricing Model. It
follows from Proposition IV.5, and Theorem IV.7, that in equilibrium, the
market portfolio can be chosen as the risky spanning portfolio. From
Theorem IV.8, the equilibrium structure of expected returns must satisfy
the Security Market Line.
Because of the mean-variance model's attractive simplicity and its
26/
strong empirical implications, a number of authors have studied the condi-
tions under which such a criterion function is consistent with the expected
utility maxim. Like the studies of general spanning properties cited in
section IV, these studies examined the question in two parts: (i) what is
the class of probability distributions such that the expected value of a
arbitrary concave utility function can be written solely as a function of mean
and variance; and (ii) what is the class of strictly concave von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions whose expected value can be written solely
as a function of mean and variance for arbitrary distributions. Since the
class of distributions in (i) was shown in section IV to be equivalent to
the class of finite variance distributions that admit two-fund spanning of
the efficient set, the analysis will not be repeated here. To answer (ii),
it is straightforward to show that a necessary condition is that U be of
the form, W - bW2, with b > 0. This member of the HARA family is called
the quadratic, and will only satisfy the von Neumann axioms if W < 1/2b,
for all possible outcomes for W. Even if U is defined to be Max[W-bW2,1/4b]
so that U satisfies the axioms for all W, for general distributions, its
expected value can be written as a function of just E(W) and Var(W), only
if the maximum possible outcome for W is less than 1/2b.
Ill
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Although both the Arrow-Debreu and Markowitz-Tobin models were shown
to be special cases of the spanning models in section IV, they deserve
special attention because they are unquestionably the genesis of these
general models.
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VI. Investment Theory for the Firm
In the preceding section of the paper, the portfolio selection problem
for individuals was solved and a set of necessary conditions for financial
equilibrium were derived. Neither the current consumption-saving choice
by individuals nor the allocation of resources for physical production were
explicitly considered. Hence, the preceding analyses are best viewed as a
partial equilibrium study of the financial markets taking current consumption
and production plans as fixed. In this section, the theory of optimal invest-
ment in physical assets is presented, and the connection between production
theory and the financial markets is made explicit. However, the optimal
choice of current consumption by individuals is still taken as given
leaving until Section VII its explicit examination.
There are two essential differences between the portfolio selection
problem and the optimal allocation of physical investment problem. First,
because it was assumed that individuals behave "competitively" with respect
to the securities market (i.e., assumption (A.2) in Section II), only linear
allocations of resources are allowed among the available investments in the
portfolio selection problem. In general, physical production technologies can
be nonlinear functions of their inputs. Also, because the available invest-
ments in the portfolio problem are securities, it is possible for an indivi-
dual to invest negative amounts in specific investments. For production
technologies, the amount of physical investment must be nonnegative.
Second, in developed market economies, most of the physical production
is carried on by business firms where the production decisions are made by
managers who are generally not the (sole) owners of the firm. Hence, it is
II[
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important to know the conditions under which an efficient allocation of
resources among the available production technologies will obtain when there
exists an institutional separation between the owners of the resources and
the managers of these resources. In essence, does there exist a set of in-
vestment decision rules such that if firm managers follow these rules, the
firm will operate "as if" the owners of the firm had made the production de-
cisions directly. Hence, unlike the utility function of an individual which
is taken to be exogeneous in the portfolio selection problem, the criterion
function for production decisions by the firm is derived, and is therefore
endogeneous.
It is well known in the theory of production under certainty that if
firms are competitive and make their production decisions so as to maximize
the market value of the firm, then a competitive equilibrium is a pareto op-
timum. Arrow [ 2] and Debreu [9 ] extended these results to uncertainty within
the framework of their "complete markets" model. However, the extent to which
these results carry over to "incomplete markets" has not as yet been determined.
Diamond [10] and more recently Leland [46], Eckern and Wilson [12], Radner
[69], and Hart [31] have derived conditions under which stockholders will
unanimously agree on a production decision. However, the "derived" criterion
function for the firm will not, in general, be "to maximize market value."
While the nonoptimality of the value maximization rule is not surprising when
firms do not behave competitively, Jensen and Long [40], Fama [16], and
Stiglitz 88] claim that it can be nonoptimal even when firms are competitive.
Merton and Subrahmanyam [62] argue that the posited firm behavior in the
Jensen-Fama-Stiglitz models is not competitive and, therefore, the findings
using their models are not inconsistent with those proven for complete markets.
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While these issues have not yet been resolved and will not be here, it is
hoped that the analysis of this section will shed some light on the contro-
versy.
A firm is defined by the single production technology it owns and let
there be n production technologies where the random variable end-of-period
value of firm j, Vj(I j;j), can be written as a function of the initial invest-
ment in its technology, Ij, and an exogeneously specified random variable
9.. Suppose there exists a set of portfolios with random variable returns
J
per dollar (X1, . . ., X , R) that span the efficient portfolio set. Let
Vjo(Ij) be the equilibrium initial value of firm j after I has been investedjo i 
in its technology. Therefore, Vjo(Ij) will satisfy the formula (IV.3) in
Theorea IV.13.
Consider a risk averse individual with utility function U(W). Prior
to investment and trading, his initial endowment contains j fractional
ownership of firm , j = 1, . .. , n, in addition to other exogeneous
assets with market value W . His initial wealth, W , can be written as
n
(VI.1) Wo( Il, In) = ZX j[ V j o( I) - Ij] + W
Consider the expanded portfolio selection problem where the investor
chooses his optimal portfolio allocation and the amount of initial investment
allocated to those firms in which he has some positive initial ownership.
As a natural extension of assumption (A.2) in the standard portfolio problem
of Section II, it is assumed that the investor believes that his actions
(including his choices for I) cannot affect the probability distribution
of returns on the set of spanning portfolios (X1, . . ., Xm, R).
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By hypothesis, (X1, . .. , X, R) span me. Hence, without loss of
generality, we can formulate the problem as:
(VI.2) Max E{U([.wi(X - R) + R]Wo)}
where wi is the fraction of his initial wealth allocated to spanning port-
mfolio Xi, i = 1, . . ., ;(1 - Elwi) is the fraction allocated to the risk-
less security; W is given by (VI.1); and "E" denotes the expectation operator
over his subjective probability distribution for (X1, . . . , Xm).
*~ m n ~~~k* *
Define W - [Wi(Xi - R) + R][ + W where
(w1, . . ., w ) are his optimal portfolio weights and (I1, . .., I ) are his1m ''n
optimal choices for initial investment in the n firms. For an interior
solution, the optimal choices will satisfy the first order conditions
(VI.3) E{U'(W*)(Xi - R)} , i = 1, . ., m
and
(VI.4) E{(W*)X Z[ (I) - 1]} - , j 1, *. ., n,
where Z* is the return per dollar on his optimal portfolio and V(I j) - aVjo/I j..
By the first-order conditions (VI.3), E{U'(W*)Z*} = R E{U'(W*)} > 0 by nonsa-
tiation. Hence, for all firms where the individual has positive initial owner-
ship (j > 0), the first-order conditions (VI.4) can be rewritten as
VI (I*) - 1 = 0 ·.Jo (VI.5)
- 64 -
From (VI.1), optimality conditions (VI.5) simply imply that for a given dis-
tribution of the spanning portfolios, the investor would prefer the allocation
of physical investment across firms to be the one that maximizes his initial
wealth. But the initial wealth function in (VI.1) does not depend upon the
investor's utility function. Hence, every investor with a positive owner-
ship of firm j will agree that the amount of physical investment in firm j
should be chosen so as to maximize its market value.
And if the investors agree on the Vj (Ij) func-
tion, then they will agree on the optimal choice for Ij. Note: This latter
condition can be satisfied even if investors do not have homogeneous beliefs
about the probability distribution for (X1, . . ., X ). For example, for
the Arrow-Debreu model in Section V, it was shown that all investors will
agree on the valuation formula (IV.3), even though they
have heterogeneous beliefs about the probability distribution for the states.
In general, with heterogeneous beliefs, investors will disagree on the amount
of investment that the firm should take to maximize its market value. How-
ever, as long as each shareholder perceives changes in the firm's investment
as having no effect on the return distributions of the efficient set, they
will agree that any change in investment which increases the market value of
the firm will be preferred to ones that do not.
Theorem VI.1 If changes in the investment made by firm j do
not change the distribution of the efficient portfolio set, then
all shareholders of firm j will agree that its investment should
be chosen to maximize its market value. In addition, if all
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such shareholders agree on the valuation function Vjo(Ij),
then the value-maximizing firm will operate "as if" the
owners of the firm had made the investment decision directly.
Of course, the critical issue is under what conditions will the hypothesis of
Theorem VI.1 obtain? One clear example is if, for every choice Ij, the
resulting equilibrium random variable return on firm j is such that it is a
"redundant" security (as defined in Sections II and IV), then changes in the
investment made by firm j will not affect the equilibrium distribution of the
efficient portfolio set. This condition will occur whenever, from the point
of view of investors, there exist other securities that are perfect substitutes
for security j. While "perfect substitutability" is sufficient, it is not
necessary as the following analysis demonstrates.
Consider the same risk averse individual in the previous analysis, but for
simplicity it is assumed that he has an initial endowment of positive frac-
tional ownership of firm j only. Assume that (X1, . ., Xm, Zj,R) span
the efficient portfolio set. The investor believes that his actions cannot
affect the distribution of returns for (X1, . . ., X , R) and he can onlym
affect the distribution of Zj through his choice of I. (VI.2) can be re-
formulated as
(VI.6) Max E{U([Zwi(Xi - R) + Wm(Z - R) + R]W)}
{w., I. } 
where wm+lis the fraction of his initial wealth allocated to firm j. The
first-order conditions for an interior solution can be written as
(VI.7) E{U'(W*)(X i - R)} = O , i - 1 . . ., m
E{U'(W*)(Zj - R)} = 0
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and
(VI.8) E{U'(W*)[(Vjo(I ) - )jXZ* + W*w*o Z(I) = 0
3o0J 3 om+lj 3
where W* X [V () - I] + W and Z(Ij) is shorthand for
a[v;(Ij;Oj)/Vjo(Ij)]/3Ij for each given value of the random variable 0.
Using (VI.7), (VI.8) can be rewritten as
(VI.9) X.R E{U'(W*)}(V! (I) - 1) + w* lW* EU'(W*)Z!(It)} = 0.
Hence, without further conditions on the distribution of the marginal return
on security j, Z!(It), the value-maximizing choice for I will not be optimal.
Of course, if the post-investment holdings of security j by the investor are
zero, (w*l = 0), then the value-maximizing choice is optimal for him, but
this will not substain a post-investment equilibrium unless all investors
would choose w*l = O.
M+l
However, if the random variable marginal return can be written in the form
Zj(It) = yj + 1 ij(Xi -R) + j(Zj -R) + cj where E(j) = E(E Xi, . . ..
Xm, Zj) = O, then using (VI.7), (VI.9) can be rewritten as
(VI.10) XjR(Vo (I) - ) + WlW* = 0.
If yj = O, then value maximization is again optimal. Even if yj 0 O, if the
condition is imposed that I* be chosen such that post-investment investors in
3
firm j would not want to change it, then XjVjo(It) = wW*, and (VI.10) can
be rewritten as
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(VI. 11) R(V! (It) - 1) + jVjo (I ) = 0.
Jo023 30jo 2
Hence, if the firm chooses its investment so as to satisfy (VI.11), then all
(pre- and post-investment) stockholders will agree on the investment chosen
by the firms. (VI.11) is an example of stockholder unanimity and the condi-
tions imposed on are the same (except for our including Ej) as in the Propo-
sition proved by Eckern and Wilson [12 , p. 1751.
If the available technologies exhibit stochastic constant returns (as in
the model of Diamond [10]) and if the technologies are freely available, then
a necessary condition for equilibrium is that the value of firm j be no larger
than the value of its factor inputs. In our structure, V (It) < I. If thejo 3 -
investment process is "reversible" or if ex ante investment decisions are agreed
upon by ex post stockholders, then Vjo(It) = I*. But stochastic constant re-
turns implies that V.(Ij;j) = Ijj and therefore Z(I*) = j. Hence,
I32323 j3 ji i
Z'(I*) = 0, and from (VI.9), value maximization is optimal.
In summary, if the choice of investment for each firm taken individually
is perceived as having no impact on the return distribution of the efficient
portfolio set, then value maximization will produce the same investment allo-
cation as would have been chosen by the stockholders of the firms if they had
made the decision directly.
There appears to be a connection between this condition and the condi-
tions for a competitive securities market. Since a change in a firm's invest-
ment choice will change its market value and can change its own return distri-
bution, the traditional definition of a competitive market as one in which no
single participant's action can affect prices in that market makes no sense
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for a securities market. However, it seems to me that a reasonable condition
for a securities market to be competitive is that no single participant's ac-
tion can affect the distribution of returns on any set of portfolios that span the
efficient portfolio set. In the case of a certainty world, this condition im-
plies that no single participant's actions can change the interest rate. In the
Arrow-Debreu model, this condition implies that no single participant's actions
can affect the prices of the pure securities (P1, .. ., P). In the Capital
Asset Pricing model, it implies that no single participant's actions can
affect the return distribution for either the market portfolio or the interest
rate. Like the traditional definition, this condition implies that no single
participant's actions can affect anything "that matters" to everyone.
While this condition is appealing, there are a number of issues that must
be resolved before it could be accepted as a definition. First, unlike prices,
return distributions are not observable. In models with homogeneous expecta-
tions, this is not a problem because, given a set of prices, the return dis-
tributions are unambiguously defined. However, in incomplete markets models
with heterogeneous beliefs, there are obvious complications. Second, the
definition, existence, and optimality properties of a "competitive" equilibrium
would require derivation. Third, while it is already a standard assumption of
portfolio theory that the actions of a single individual or financial institu-
tion will not affect the distribution of returns on securities, the case for
individual firms investment decisions is more subtle. In discussing the
value maximization criterion in incomplete markets, Radner notes that with the
exception of the Diamond model, "I have not seen a formulation of this
hypothesis that enables the producer to act as a price-taker; i.e., that does
not imply that the producer is able to calculate the effect of his actions
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on the equilibrium prices.'- / In general, his comment would also apply to the assump-
tion that producers take the distribution of the efficient set as given. While
this issue merits careful study, my suspicion is that if significant non-
trivial spanning of the efficient set obtains, then a producer might not be
able to calculate the effect of his actions on the equilibrium return distribu-
tion for the efficient set. If these issues can be satisfactorily decided,
then much of the current controversy surrounding the theory of the firm with
incomplete securities markets will be settled.
In discussing the investment decision by firms, it was assumed that each
firm had a single production technology and the investment decision was to
choose the intensity at which the technology is operated. However, firms can
also make investments by buying other firms' technologies. To examine the
effects of this type of investment, suppose that the first k technologies are
owned by a single firm and so, instead of n, there are only n - k + 1 firms.
If there are no economies of scale in such a consolidation (i.e., no
"synergy"), then the end-of-period value for the consolidated firm can be
written as
k
V(I1' ' 'k; e1' ' ' " ) - Z1 Vj(Zj; Oj).
Theorem VI.2 Suppose (X1, . . ., Xm , R) span the efficient
portfolio set and (VI.12) holds. If the return distribution
for (X1, . . ., Xm, R) remains the same as it was prior to
consolidation, then, post consolidation, the initial value
of the consolidated firm is given by
1k j (Ij)V0 jo 
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The proof follows immediately from the "value additivity" properly derived in
Corollary IV.13.a. Indeed, if the investment decision of any single firm
(including the consolidated firm) cannot affect the distribution of (X1,
.., Xm, R); (VI.12) holds;and firms make their investment decision accord-
ing to the value maximization rule, then from Theorem VI.2, the investment
allocation chosen by the consolidated firm will be identical to the alloca-
tion that would have been chosen by the k individual firms. In this case,
consolidation of firms has no effect on individual welfare because both the
initial wealth of each individual and the return distribution on his optimal
portfolio will remain unchanged. Indeed, if (VI.12) holds and the (pre-
consolidation) allocation of investment is optimal, then individuals cannot
be any better off after consolidation. However, it is possible that, post-
consolidation, investors could be worse off. For example, suppose there do
not exist "perfect substitute" securities for at least some of the individual
firms and pre-consolidation, not all investors chose to hold these k firms in
proportion to their market values. Since, post-consolidation, investors can
only hold these k firms in the same relative proportions, some pre-consolida-
tion optimal portfolios will not be feasible after consolidation, and therefore
some individuals could be worse off.
In an analogous fashion to the individual's portfolio selection be-
havior, it has been argued that firms acquire other firms to reduce risk. How-
ever, unless an acquisition provides a production opportunity otherwise un-
available or unless the acquired firm was not operating its technology efficiently,
diversification by the firm cannot improve the welfare of individuals, and in
some cases it can reduce it. This result serves as a warning against the in-
discriminate use of models that treat firms "like" individuals and ascribe
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to the firms exogeneously given utility functions rather than deriving
endogeneous criterion functions for ranking their choices.
In the discussion of the investment decision by firms, the method of
financing these investments was not made explicit. Implicitly, it was assumed
that firms used internally available funds or issued additional financial
securities where all financial claims against the firm were of a single type
called equity. Of course, it is well known that, in addition to equity, firms
also issue other types of financial claims (e.g., debt, preferred stock,
and convertible bonds). The choice of the menu of financial liabilities is
called the firm's financing decision. Although, in general, the optimal
investment and financing decisions by a firm are determined simultaneously,
it is useful to study the financing decision by taking the in-
vestment decision as given.
Consider firm with random variable end-of-period value V and q
different financial claims, The kth such financial claim is defined by the
function fk[V j] which describes how the holders of this security will share
in the end-of-period value of the firm. The production technology and
choice of investment intensity, Vj(Ij;Oj) and Ij, are taken as given. If it
is assumed that the end-of-period value of the firm is independent of its
choice of financial liabilities,- then V (Ij;j), and Eq f Vj(Ij;j)1 k Vj(j
for every outcome 9..
3
Suppose when firm j is all equity financed, there exists an equilibrium
such that the initial value of firm is given by Vo(I).
I
- 72 -
Theorem VI.3 If firm j is financed by q different claims
defined by the functions fk(V), k = 1, . .. , q and if there
exists an equilibrium such that the return distributions of
the efficient portfolio set Remains unchanged from the
equilibrium in which firm j was all equity financed, then
fko = V j(Ij)1 ko Jo j
where fko is the equilibrium initial value of financial claim k.
Proof: In the equilibrium in which firm j is all equity financed, the end-
of period random variable value of firm j is V(Ij;Oj) and the
initial value, V (Ij ), is given by formula (IV.3)
where (X1, . . ., Xm,R) spans the efficient set. Consider now
that firm j is financed by the q different claims. The random
variable end-of-period value of firm , fk is still given by
Vj(Ij;Oj). By hypothesis, there exists an equilibrium such that
the distribution of the efficient portfolio set remains unchanged,
and therefore the distribution of (X1, . . ., X , R) remains un-
changed. By inspection of formula (IV.3),
the initial value of firm j will remain unchanged, and therefore,
1 fko = Vo( 
Hence, for a given investment policy, the way in which the firm finances
this investment will not affect the market value of the firm unless the
choice of financial instruments changes the return distributions of the effi-
cient portfolio set. Theorem VI.3 is representative of a class of theorems
that describe the impact of financing policy on the market value of a firm
when the investment decision is held fixed, and this class is generally re-
ferred to as "Modigliani-Miller Theorems" after the pioneering work in this
29/direction by Modigliani and Miller.-
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Clearly, a sufficient condition for Theorem VI.3 to obtain is that
each of the financial claims issued by the firm are "redundant securities"
(as defined in Sections II and IV). This condition will be satisfied by
the subclass of financial securities that provide for linear sharing rules.
I.e., fk(V) = akV + bk where ZE ak = 1 and bk = 0. They are redundant
securities because the investor can replicate exactly the payoff structure
of each claim by a portfolio combination of the (all-equity) firm and the risk-
less security. Hence, in this case, Theorem VI.3 will obtain as a special case of
Proposition IV.1. Indeed, an example of this subclass is in the original Modigliani-
Miller paper where they examined the effect on firm values of borrowing by firms under
the assumption that borrowing (either by firms or individuals) is riskless and there
is no bankruptcy.
It should be pointed out that the linear structure for firm borrowings
only applies if there is no chance of default on the debt. Consider the
case of a single homogeneous debt issue where the firm promises to pay B
dollars at the end of the period and in the event the firm does not pay
(i.e., defaults), then ownership of the firm is transferred to the debtholders.
If the equity of the firm has limited liability, then the payoff function to
the debt, fl, can be written as
(VI.13) f =(Vj) Min[Vj, B]
and the payoff function to the equity, f2, can be written as
(VI.14) f2(VJ ) = Max[O, Vi - B].
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Hence, fl and f2 will have a linear sharing-rule structure oly if the proba-
bility that VJ < B is zero.
While the linearity of the sharing rules is sufficient, it is not a nec-
essary condition for Theorem VI.3 to obtain as Stiglitz [87] has shown for
the Arrow-Debreu and Capital Asset Pricing Models, and as will be demonstrated
in Section VII.
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VII. Intertemporal Consumption and Portfolio Selection Theory
As with the preceeding analyses here, most papers on investment theory
under uncertainty have assumed that individuals act so as to maximize the
expected utility of end-of-period wealth and that intra-period revisions
-are not allowed' Therefore, all events which take place after next period are
irrelevant to their decisions. Of course, individuals, and therefore firms,
do care about events beyond "next period," and they can review their alloca-
tions periodically. Hence, the one-period, static analyses will only be valid
under those conditions such that an intertemporally-maximizing individual
acts, each period, as if he were a one-period, expected utility-of-wealth
maximizer. In this section, the lifetime consumption-portfolio selection
problem is solved, and conditions are derived under which the one-period
static portfolio problem will be an appropriate "surrogate" for the dynamic,
multi-period portfolio problem.
As in the early contributions by Hakansson [29], Leland [45],
Samuelson [78] and Merton [53], the problem of choosing optimal portfolio
and consumption rules for an individual who lives T years is formulated as
follows. The individual chooses his consumption and portfolio allocation
for each period so as to maximiz 3 0/
(VII.l) T-1(VII.1) E {O U[C(t),t] +B[W(T),T]}
where C(t) is consumption chosen at age t; W(t) is wealth at age t; "Et"
is the conditional expectation operator conditional on knowing all relevant
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information available as of time t; the utility function (during life) U
is assumed to be strictly concave in C and the "bequest" function B is
also assumed to be concave in W.
It is assumed that there are n risky securities with random variable
returns between time t and t+l denoted by Zl(t+l), . . , Zn(t+l), and
there is a riskless security whose return between t and t+l, R(t), will be
known with certainty as of time t.31 / When the individual "arrives" at
date t, he will know the value of his portfolio, W(t). He chooses how
much to consume, C(t), and then reallocates the balance of his wealth,
W(t) - C(t), among the available securities. Hence, the accumulation
32/
equation between t and t+l can be written as-
(VII.2) W(t+l) = [En wj(t)[Zj(t+l) - R(t)] + R(t)][W(t) - C(t)]
where wj(t) is the fraction of his portfolio allocated to security j at
date t, j=l, . . ., n. Because the fraction allocated to the riskless se-
curity can always be chosen to equal 1 - w(t), the choices for wl(t),
., w (t) are unconstrained.
It is assumed that there exist m state variables, {Sk(t)}, such that
the stochastic processes for {Z (t+l), ... , Zn(t+l), S(t+l), . . S(t+l)}
are Markov with respect to Sl(t), . . ., S (t), and S(t) will denote the
m
33/
m-vector of state variable values at time t.-
The method of stochastic dynamic programming is used to derive the optimal
consumption and portfolio rules. Define the function, J[W(t), S(t), t], by
(VII.3) J[W(t),S(t),t] _ Max E U[C(T),T] + B[W(T),T]}.t t
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J, therefore, is the (utility) value of the balance of the individual's
optimal consumption investment program from date t forward, and, in this
context, is called the "derived"utility of wealth function. By the
Principle of Optimality, (VII.3) can be rewritten as
(VII.4) J[W(t),S(t),t] = Max{U[C(t),t] + Et(J[W(t+l),S(t+l),t+l])}
where "Max" is over the current decision variables [C(t),wl(t), .
wn(t)]. Substituting for W(t+l) in (VII.4) from (VII.2) and differentiat-
ing with respect to each of the decision variables, we can write the n+l
34/first order conditions for a regular interior maximum as--3
(VII.5) 0 = Uc[C*(t),t] - Et{Jw[W(t+l),S(t+l),t+l](Elwj(Zj-R) + R)}
and
(VII.6) 0 = Et{Jw[W(t+l),S(t+l),t+l](Z j - R)}, jl, 2, . .. , n
where UC - aU/aC; JW - aJ/aW; and (C*,w*) are the optimum values for the
decision variables. Henceforth, except where needed for clarity, the time
indices will be dropped. Using (VII.6), (VII.5) can be rewritten as
(VII.7) 0 = U[C*,t] - R Et{Jw}.
To solve for the complete optimal program, one first solves (VII.6)
and (VII.7) for C* and w* as functions of W(t) and S(t) when t = T-1.
This can be done because J[W(T),S(T),T] = B[W(T),T], a given function.
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Substituting the solutions for C*(T-1) and w*(T-l) in the right-hand side
of (VII.4), (VII.4) becomes an equation and therefore one has J[W(T-1),S(T-l),
T-1]. Using (VII.6), (VII.7), and (VII.4), one can proceed to solve for
the optimal rules in earlier periods in the usual "backwards" recursive
fashion of dynamic programming. Having done so, one will have a complete
schedule of optimal consumption and portfolio rules for each date expressed
as functions of the (then) known state variables W(t), S(t), and t.
Moreover, as Samuelson [ 78 1 has shown, the optimal consumption
rules will satisfy the "envelope condition" expressed as
(VII.8) Jw[W(t), S(t), t] = Uc[C*(t), t].
I.e., at the optimum, the marginal utility of wealth (future consumption)
will just equal the marginal utility of (current) consumption. Moreover,
from (VII.8), it is straightforward to show that JWW < 0 because UCC < 0.
Hence, J is a strictly concave function of wealth.
A comparison of the first order conditions for the static portfolio
selection problem, (II.4) in Section II, with the corresponding conditions
(VII.6) for the dynamic problem will show that they are formally quite
similar. Of course, they do differ in that, for the former case, the utility
function of wealth is taken to be exogeneous while, in the latter, it is
derived. However, the more fundamental difference in terms of derived
portfolio selection behavior is that J is not only a function of W but
also a function of S. The analogous condition in the static case would
be that the end-of-period utility function of wealth is also state dependent.
- 79 -
To see that this difference is not trivial, consider the Rothschild-
Stiglitz of riskier that was used in the one-period analysis to partition
the feasible portfolio set into its efficient and inefficient parts. Let
W1 and W2 be the random variable, end-of-period values of two portfolios
with identical expected values. If W2 is equal in distribution to W1 + Z
where E(ZJW1) = O, then from (II.10) and (II.11), W2 is riskier than W1
and every risk averse maximizer of the expected utility of end-of-period
wealth would prefer W1 to W2. However, consider an intertemporal maximizer
with a strictly concave, derived utility function J. It will not, in
general be true that Et{J[W (t+l),t+l]} > Et{J[W2,S(t+l),t+l]}. Therefore,
although the intertemporal maximizer selects his portfolio for only one
period at a time, the optimal portfolio selected may be one that would never
be chosen by any risk-averse, one-period maximizer. Hence, the portfolio
selection behavior of an intertemporal maximizer will, in general, be opera-
tionally distinguishable from the behavior of a static maximizer.
To adapt the Rothschild-Stiglitz definition to the intertemporal case,
a stronger condition is required. Namely, if W2 is equal in distribution
to W1 + Z where E[ZW 1l,S(t+l)] = O, then every risk-averse intertemporal
maximizer would prefer to hold W1 rather than W 2 in the period t to t+l.
The proof follows immediately from the concavity of J and Jensen's Inequality.
Namely, Et{J[W2, S(t+l),t+l]} = Et{E(J[W 2,S(t+l),t+l]Ww,S(t+l))}. By Jensen's
Inequality, E(J[W2,S(t+l),t+l]W 1l,S(t+l)) < J[E(W2 1W1,S(t+l)), S(t+l),t+l]
= J[W 1,S(t+l),t+l], and, therefore, Et{J[W2(t+l),t+l]} < Et[Wl,S(t+l),t+l]}.
Hence, "noise" as denoted by Z must not only be noise relative to W1 but
noise relative to the state variables Sl(t+l), . ., Sm(t+l). All the
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analyses of the preceeding sections can be formally adapted to the inter-
temporal framework by simply requiring that the "noise" terms there, , have
the additional property that Et(elS(t+l)) = Et(e) = 0. Hence, in the ab-
sence of further restrictions on the distributions, the resulting efficient
portfolio set for intertemporal maximizers will be larger than in the static case.
However, under certain conditions,3 5 / the portfolio selection behavior
of intertemporal maximizers will be "as if' they were one-period maximizers.
For example, if Et[Zj(t+l)] Z j(t+l) = Et[Zj(t+l)IS(t+l)], j=l, 2, ., n,
then the additional requirement that Et(clS(t+l)) = 0 will automatically
be satisfied for any feasible portfolio, and the original Rothschild-
Stiglitz "static" definition will be valid. Indeed, in the cited papers
by Hakansson, Leland, Samuelson, and Merton, it is assumed that the security
returns {Zl(t), . . ., Zn(t)} are serially independent and identically
distributed in time which clearly satisfies this condition. Define the
investment opportunity set at time tto be the joint distribution for
{Zl(t+l), . . ., Z(t+l)} and the return on the riskless security, R(t).
The Hakansson et al papers assume that the investment opportunity set is
constant through time. The condition Zj(t+l) = Et[Zj(t+l) IS(t+l)], j=1,
. .. , n, will also be satisfied if changes in the investment opportunity
set are either completely random or time dependent in a nonstochastic
fashion. Moreover, with the possible exception of a few perverse cases,
these are the only conditions on the investment opportunity set under which
Zj(t+l) = Et [Z(t+l)S(t+l)], j=l, . . n. Hence, for arbitrary concave
utility functions, the one-period analysis will be a valid surrogate for
the intertemporal analysis only if changes in the investment opportunity set
satisfy these conditions.
III
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Of course, by inspection of (VII.6), if J were of the form V[W(t),t] +
H[S(t),t] so that JW = VW is only a function of wealth and time, then for
arbitrary investment opportunity sets, such an intertemporal investor will
act "as if" he is a one-period maximizer. Unfortunately, the only concave
utility function that will produce such a J function and satisfy the addi-
tivity specification in (VII.1) is U[C,t] = a(t) log[C] and B[W,T] = b(T) log[W]
where either a = 0 and b > 0 or a > 0 and b > O. While some have argued
36/that this utility function is of special normative significaace,36 any model
whose results depend singularly upon all individuals having the same utility
function ;here, in addition, the utility function must have a specific form,
can only be viewed as an example, and not the basis for a theory.
Hence, in general, the one-period, static analysis will not be rich
enough to describe the investment behavior of individuals in an intertemporal
framework. Indeed, without additional assumptions, the only derived restric-
tions on optimal demand functions and equilibrium security returns are the
ones that rule out arbitrage. Hence, to deduce additional properties, fur-
ther assumptions about the dynamics of the investment opportunity set will
be needed. · However, before these assumptions are introduced, I make a brief
37/digression.37
There are three time intervals or horizons involved in-the consumption-
portfolio problem. First, there is the trading horizon which is the mini-
mum length of time between which successive transactions by economic agents
can be made in the market. In a equence-of-markets analysis, it is the
length of time between successive market openings, and is therefore part
of the specification of the structure of markets in the economy. While this
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structure will depend upon the tradeoff between the costs of operating the
market and its benefits, this time scale is not determined by the individual
investor, and is the same for all investors in the economy. Second, there
is the decision horizon which is the length of time between which the
investor makes successive decisions, and it is the minimum time between
which he would take any action. For example, an investor with a fixed
decision interval of one month, who makes a consumption decision and port-
folio allocation today will under no conditions make any new decisions or
take any action prior to one month from now. This time scale is determined
by the costs to the individual of processing information and making de-
cisions, and is chosen by the individual. Third, there is the planning hori-
zon which is the maximum length of time for which the investor gives any
weight in his utility function. Typically, this time scale would correspond
to the balance of his lifetime and is denoted by "T" in the formulation
(VII.1).
The static approach to portfolio selection implicitly assumes that
the individual's decision and planning horizons are the same: "one period."
While the intertemporal approach distinguishes between the two, when indivi-
dual demands are aggregated to determine market equilibrium relationships,
it is implicitly assumed in both approaches that the decision interval is
the same for all investors, and therefore corresponds to the trading inter-
val. If "h" denotes the length of time in the trading interval, then every
solution derived has, as an implicit argument, h. Clearly, if one were to
change h, then the derived behavior of investors would change, as indeed
38/
would any deduced equilibrium relationships.- I might mention, somewhat
III
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parenthetically, that empirical researchers almost uniformly neglect to
recognize that h is part of a model's specification. For example, in
Theorem IV.6, the returns on securities were shown to have a linear re-
lationship to the returns on a set of spanning portfolios. However, because
the n-period return on a security is the product (and not the sum) of the
one-period returns, this linear relationship can only obtain for single time
interval, h. If we define a fourth time interval, the observation horizon,
to be the length of time between successive observations of the data by the
researcher, then the usual practice is to implicitly assume that the decision
and trading intervals are equal to the observation interval. This is done
whether the observation interval is daily, weekly, monthly, or annually!
If the "Frictionless" markets assumption (A.1) is extended to include
no costs of information processing or of operating the markets, then it
follows that all investors would prefer to have "h" as small as physically
possible. Indeed, the aforementioned general assumption that all investors
have the same decision interval will, in general, only be valid if all
such costs are zero. This said, it is natural to consider the limiting case
when h tends to zero, and trading takes place continuously in time.
Returning from this digression on time scales, consider an economy
where the trading interval, h, is sufficiently small such that the state
description of the economy can change only "locally" during the interval
(t,t+h). Formally, the Markov stochastic processes for the state variables,
S(t), are assumed to satisfy the property that one-step transitions are
permitted only to the nearest neighboring states. The analogous condition
in the limiting case of continuous time is that the sample paths for S(t)
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are continuous functions of time. I.e., for every realization of S(t+h)
except possibly on a set of measure zero, lim[Sk(t+h) - Sk(t)] = 0, k=l,
h-+0
. ., m. If, however, in the continuous limit, the uncertainty of
"end-of-period" returns is to be preserved, then, an additional
requirement is that lim[Sk(t+h) - Sk(t)]/h exists almost nowhere. I.e.,
h-+O
even though the sample paths are continuous, the increments to the states
are not, and therefore, in particular, "end-of-period" rates of return
will not be "predictable" even in the continuous time limit. The class
of stochastic processes that satisfy these conditions are called diffusion
39/processes.-
Although such processes are almost nowhere differentiable in the usual
sense, under some mild regularity conditions, there is a generalized
theory of stochastic differential equations which allows their instantaneous
40/
dynamics to be expressed as the solution to the system of equations.40
(VII.9) dSi(t) = Gi(S,t)dt + Hi(st)dqi(t) , i=1 . .. , m,
where Gi(S,t) is the instantaneous expected change in Si(t) per unit time
at time t; H. is the instantaneous variance of the change in Si(t) where1 1
it is understood that these statistics are conditional on S(t) = S. The
dqi(t) are Weiner processes with the instantaneous correlation coefficient
per unit of time between dqi(t) and dqj(t) given by the function nij (S,t), i,
41/
j=l, . . ., m. Moreover, the functions {Gi, Hi, i' i, j=l, . ., m}
completely describe the transition probabilities for S(t) between any two
42/dates.
11
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Under the assumption that the returns on securities can be described
by diffusion processes, Merton [54] has solved the continuous-time analog
to the discrete-time formualtion in (VII.i). Namely,
(VII.10) Max E f tU[C(t),t] dt + B[W(T),T]t
43/
Adapting the notation in that paper,4 3 / the rate of return dynamics on the
security j can be written as
~(VII.1) dP.(VII.ll) ].j = (St) dt + aj(S,t) dZ. , j=l, . .. , n
where aj is the instantaneous conditional expected rate of return per unit
time; 2 is its instantaneous conditional variance per unit time; and dZj
are Weiner processes with the instantaneous correlation coefficient per
unit time between dZj(t) and dZk(t) given by the function pjk(S,t), j, k=l,
., n. In addition to the n risky securities, there is a riskless
security whose instantaneous rate of return per unit time is the interest
rate r(t).44/ To complete the model's dynamics description, define the
functions pij(S,t) to be the instantaneous correlation coefficients per
45/
unit time between dqi(t) and dZ.(t), i=l, .. , m; j=l, . ,
If J is defined by
(VII.12) J[W(t), S(t), t] E Max Et{ U[C(T),T]dT + B[W(T),T] ,
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46/then the continuous-time analog to (VII.4) can be written as-
(VII.13) 0 = Max{U[C,t] + Jt + JW[( Z1 wj(aj-r)+r)W - C] + 1 JiGi +
1JWW n n W2 1 m m
2 WW 1 iwjij + 2 1 Jij Hi Hj "ij +
m n w a H U WI
1 1 iW j i ij
where the subscripts t, W, i on J denote partial derivatives with respect
to the arguments t, W, and S (i=l, . . ., m) of J, respectively and ij..
iajpij is the instantaneous covariance of the returns of security i with
security j, i, j=l, ... , n. As was the case in (VII.4), the "Max" in
(VII.13) is over the current decision variables [C(t),wl(t), . .. , Wn(t)].
If C* and w* are the optimum rules, then the (n+l) first-order conditions
for (VII.13) can be written as
(VII.14) 0 = UCC*,t] - Jw[W,S,t]
and
n m
(VII.15) 0 = J (a-r) + JWW Z w*ij W + 1 J jHiij, j=l, , n.
(VII.14) is identical to the "envelope condition," (VII.8 ), in the discrete
time analysis. However, unlike (VII.6 ) in the discrete time analysis,
(VII.15) is a system of equations which is linear in the optimal demands
for risky securities. Hence, if none of the risky securities is redundant,
then (VII.15) can be solved explicitly for the optimal demand functions
using standard matrix inversion. I.e.,
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w*(t)W(t) = K n Vk j(VII.16) w-(t)W(t) = K 1 k(akr) + 1 BiCij j=l, . . ., n
where Vkj is the k-jth element of the inverse of the instantaneous
variance-covariance matrix of returns [ij ]; ij v H K -JW/J;i n vkj kH i ik;
and Bi -Ji W/WW i l, , m.
As an immediate consequence of (VII.16), we have the following mutual
fund theorem:
Theorem VII.1 If the returns dynamics are described by
(VII.9) and (VII.11), then there exists (m+2) mutual funds
constructed from linear combinations of the available securi-
ties such that, independent of preferences, wealth distribu-
tion, or planning horizon, individuals will be indifferent
between choosing from a linear combination of these (m+2) funds
or a linear combination of the original n risky securities
and the riskless security.
Proof: Let mutual fund #1 be the riskless security; let mutual
fund #2 hold fraction, 6j 1 vk r), in security j, j=l,
n
. ., n, and the balance (1 - 1 6j) in the riskless security;
let mutual fund #(2+i) hold fraction, 6 cij. in security j,
n ij=l, . .., n and the balance (1 - En 6 ) in the riskless1 j
security for i=l, . . , m. Consider a portfolio of these mu-
tual funds which allocates d2(t) = K dollars to fund #2;
d2+i(t) = Bi dollars to fund (#2+i), i, . . ., m; and
2+i 1
dl(t) = W(t) E2+m di(t) dollars to fund #1. By inspection
of (VII.16), this portfolio of funds exactly replicates the
optimal portfolio holdings chosen from among the original n
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risky securities and the riskless security. However, the
fractional holdings of these securities by the (m+2) funds
do not depend upon the preferences, wealth, or planning horizon
of the individuals investing in the funds. Hence, every
investor can replicate his optimal portfolio by investing in
the (m+2) funds.
Of course, as with the mutual fund theorems of Section IV, Theorem VII.1
is vacuous if m > n + 1. However, for m << n, the (m+2) portfolios pro-
vide for a nontrivial spanning of the efficient portfolio set, and it is
straightforward to show that the instantaneous returns on individual
securities will satisfy the same linear specification relative to these
spanning portfolios as was derived in Theorem IV.6 for the one-period
analysis.
It was shown in the discrete-time analysis that if Et[Zj(t+l) S(t)]
= Zj(t+l), j=l, . .. , n, then the intertemporal maximizer will act "as
if" he were a static maximizer of the expected utility of end-of-period
wealth. The corresponding condition in the continuous-time case translates
into ij = 0, i=l, . . ., m and j=l, . . ., n. Under these conditions,
the optimal demand functions in (VII.16) can be rewritten as
(VII.17) w.!(t)W(t) = K lvjk(k - r) , j=l . . ., n.
From inspection of (VII.17), the relative holdings of risky securities,
w(t)/wi(t), will be the same for all investors, and, hence, the efficient
Al
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portfolio set will be spanned by just two funds: a single risky fund and
the riskless security. Moreover, by the procedure used to prove Theorem IV.9
and Theorem IV.10 in the static analysis, the efficient portfolio set here
can be shown to be generated by the set of portfolios with minimum (in-
stantaneous) variance for a given expected rate of return. Hence, under
these conditions, the continuous-time intertemporal maximizer will act "as
if" he were a static, Markowitz-Tobin mean-variance maximizer. Although
the demand functions are formally identical to those derived from the
mean-variance model, the continuous-time analysis is valid for any concave
utility function and does not assume that security returns are normally
distributed. Indeed, if, for example, the investment opportunity set
{aj, r, aij, i, j=l, . . ., n is constant through time, then from (VII.11),
the return on each risky security will be lognormally distributed which
implies that all securities will have limited liability.47/
In the general case described in Theorem VII.1, the qualitative be-
havioral differences between an intertemporal maximizer and a static maxi-
pizer can be clarified further by analyzing the characteristics of the
derived spanning portfolios.
As already shown, fund #1 and fund #2 are the "usual" portfolios that
would be mixed to provide an optimal portfolio for a static maximizer. Hence,
the intertemporal behavioral differences are characterized by funds #(2+i),
i=l, . .. , m. At the level of demand functions, the "differential demand"
for risky security , ADS, is defined to be the difference between the de-
mand for that security by an intertemporal maximizer at time t and the
demand for that security by a static maximizer of the expected utility
of "end-of-period" wealth where the absolute risk aversion and current
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wealth of the two maximizers are the same. Noting that K -JW/JWW is the
reciprocal of the absolute risk aversion of the derived utility of wealth
function, from (VII.16), we have that
(VII.18) AD = Bi.i. , j=l, . .., n.
1 iij
Lemma VII.1 Define dY1 dSi (Z1 6 Pt -rdt)+--rdt) The
t J
set of portfolio weights {6?} that minimize the (instantaneous)
variance of dYi are given by = ij j=l, ... , n and i=l,
., m.
Proof: The instantaneous variance on dYi is equal to [H - 2 En6tHiaji..
+ 1Z1 6t6kajk] . Hence, the minimizing set of {6} will satisfy11 jkj.k 2
o = -Hiajij + 1 6tkojk' j=l, ., n. By matrix inversion,
j = ij
dP.
The instantaneous rate of return on fund #(2+i) is exactly [rdt + ij( p rdt)]
Hence fund #(2+i) can be described as that feasible portfolio whose rate of
return most closely replicates the instantaneous change in state variable ¶
Si(t), and this is true for i=l, . .. , m.
Consider the special case where there exist securities that are instantaneously
perfectly correlated with changes in each of the state variables. Without loss
of generality, assume that the first m securities are the securities such
that dPi/P is perfectly positively correlated with dSi, i=l, m.
In this case,48 / the demand functions (VII.16) can be rewritten in the form
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w*(t)W(t) = KZ1 vik( k - r) + BiHi/ i1 . . . m
K Vik( k - r) , i-m+l, . . ., n.
Hence, the relative holdings of securities m+l through n will be the same
for all investors, and the differential demand functions can be rewritten
as
AD* = BH/ai i i 1 i=l, . . ., m
= 0 i--m+l, . . ., n.
The composition of fund #(2+i) reduces to a simple combination of security
i and the riskless security.
The behavior implied by the demand functions in (VII.16) can be more
easily interpreted if they are rewritten in terms of the direct utility
and optimal consumption functions. The optimal consumption function has
the form C*(t) = C*(W,S,t), and from (VII.14), it follows immediately that
(VII.21) K = -UC [c*,t]/(ucc[C*,t] ac*/aw)
Bi = -(ac*/as i ) / ( ac */ aw ) i=l, . . , m.
Because C*/aW > 0, it follows that the sign of Bi equals the sign of
(-ac*/asi). An unanticipated change in a state variable is said to be
unfavorable if, ceteris paribus, such a change would reduce current optimal
(VII.19)
(VII.20)
YI_____I___I__II__-^- -___
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consumption. E.g., an unanticipated increase in Si would be unfavorable
if ac*/3S i < 0. Inspection of (VII.20), for example, shows that for such
an individual, the differential demand for security i (which is perfectly
positively correlated with changes in Si) will be positive. If there is
an unanticipated increase in Si, then, ceteris paribus, there will be an
unanticipated increase in his wealth. Because ac*/aw > 0, this increase
in wealth will tend to offset the negative impact on C* caused by the
increase in Si, and therefore, the unanticipated variation in C* will be
reduced. In effect, by holding more of this security, he expects to be
"compensated" by larger wealth in the event that Si changes in the unfavor-
able direction. Of course, if ac*/aS i > 0, then he will take a differ-
entially short position. However, in all cases, investors will allocate
their wealth to the funds #(2+i), i=l, . .. , m, so as to "hedge" against
unfavorable changes in the state variables S(t).49/
In the usual static model, such hedging behavior will not be observed
because the utility function depends only upon end-of-period wealth, and
therefore it is implicitly assumed that aC*/aSi = 0, i=l, . . ., m. Thus,
in the intertemporal model, securities have, in addition to their manifest
function of providing an "efficient" risk-return tradeoff for end-of-period
wealth, a latent function of allowing consumers to "hedge" against other
50/
uncertainties.5
It was shown in Section IV that a necessary and sufficient condition
for a set of portfolios to span the efficient portfolio set is that the
returns on every security can be written as a linear function of the returns
on the spanning portfolios plus noise. Moreover, for the spanning property
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to have operational significance, the size of the minimum spanning set, M*,
must be very much smaller than the number of available securities, n+l.
This linearity requirement would appear to virtually rule out nontrivial
spanning unless the markets are already complete in the Arrow-Debreu sense.
To see this consider the following: suppose there exists a nontrivial span-
ning set ( , . . X, R) and the return on all-equity financed firm j
satisfies the linearity condition. Suppose firm j changes its liabilities
structure by issuing debt and retiring some equity where the end-of-period
values of the two claims are given by (VI.13) and (VI.14) in Section VI.
Although the payoffs to these claims are perfectly functionally related to
the end-of-period value of the firm, this functional relationship is non-
linear if there is a positive probability of default. Hence, the returns on
either of these claims will not, in general, be expressible as a linear function of the
returns on the spanning portfolios plus noise. Therefore, upon such a change
in firm j's liability structure, the size of the spanning set would, in
general, have to increase. In effect, because the payoff to these liabilities
cannot be replicated by a portfolio combination of the previously-existing
securities, there are no "perfect substitutes" for the created liabilities among
these securities. While "perfect substitutability" is not a necessary
condition for the spanning set to remain unchanged, without it, it is unlikely
that this set will remain unchanged. Because firms can and do issue
many different liabilities, it is, therefore, unlikely that the size of
the minimum spanning set will differ significantly from the number of se-
curities outstanding in incomplete market models with arbitrary concave
utility functions.
a. .- I-------
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While the issuing of nonlinear liabilities has this effect in the static
and discrete-time dynamic models, it does not for the continuous-time model
described here. To illustrate, consider the following example which uses a
type of analysis first presented by Black and Scholes [5] in the context of
option pricing. Let V be the value of some security whose return dynamics
are described by the diffusion process.
(VII.23) dV adt + tadZ
where a and a are, at most, functions of V and t so that the process is
Markov. Let W be the price of some security whose value as of a specified
date in the future, T*, is given by the function g[V(T*)] where g[O] = 0
and g[V(T*)]/V(T*) is bounded.
Let f(V,t) be the solution to the partial differential equation5 1/
(VII. 24) 1 O2V~fvv =20
(VII.24) 1 a 2V2f W + rVf - rf + ft 
subject to the boundary conditions
(VII.25) (a) f[O,t] = 0
(b) f[V,T*] = g[V]
(c) f/V bounded,
where i this example the interest rate r is taken to be constant over
time and subscripts denote partial derivatives.
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Consider the continuous-time portfolio strategy where the investor
allocates the fraction w(t) to the security with value V(t) and [1 - w(t)]
to the riskless security. If w(t) is a right-continuous function and P(t)
denotes the value of the portfolio at time t, then the dynamics for P must
satisfy
(VII.26) dP = [w( - r) + r]Pdt + waPdZ.
Suppose the particular portfolio strategy chosen is w(t) = fV[V,t]V(t)/P(t).
Substituting this strategy into (VII.26), we have that
(VII.27) dP = [fvV( - r) + rP]dt + fVadZ.
521
Since f is twice-continuously differentiable, ItO's Lemma- can be used
to express the stochastic process for f as
1 2 2
(VII.28) dg -- [a V f + aVfv + ft]dt + faVdZ
But f satisfies (VII.24), and therefore (VII.28) can be rewritten as
(VII.29) df - [fV( - r) + rf]dt + fVVOdZ.
Comparing (VII.29) with (VII.27), if the initial investment in the port-
folio, P(O), is chosen such that P(Q) = f[V(0),O], then P(t) = f[V,t] for
all V and t < T*. But P(t) is a feasible portfolio strategy with the
properties that P(t) = 0 if V(t) = 0 and P(T*) = g[V(T*)]. Hence, if the
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value of the other security, W(t), does not equal P(t) for each t, then
there will exist an arbitrage opportunity. Therefore, W(t) = f[V(t),t].
Since g can be a nonlinear function, it has been shown that there exists
a dynamic portfolio strategy that will exactly replicate the payoff to a
nonlinear function of the price of the security. The application of this
procedure to the debt-equity case of (VI.13) and (VI.14) is immediate. If
V denotes the value of the firm, then the debt issue will satisfy (VII.24)
with g[V] = min[V,B] and the equity will satisfy the same equation but
with g[V] = max[O,V-B]. In addition, this type of analysis can be used to
show that the Modigliani-Miller Theorem (Theorem VI.3) will obtain for
53/
nonlinear sharing rules.53/ Finally, inspection of (VII.24) shows
that knowledge of the expected return on V, a, is not required to solve
for the values of the various claims, and indeed the only non-observable
2
input required is the variance rate, a . Moreover, (VII.24) often yields
closed-form solutions and in those cases where it does not, there exist
efficient numerical solution techniques. Hence, this type of analysis has
led to a copious theoretical and empirical literature on the pricing of
54/
corporate liabilities and contingent claims generally.-5
In summary, the combined assumptions of continuous trading and local
state variable changes substantially simplifies the analysis required in
the discrete-time case. Under these conditions, the crucial non:-trivial
spanning properties will obtain, and the creation of firm-contingent
liabilities will not, in general, affect the equilibrium. Although contin-
uous-trading is only a theoretical proposition, it has been shown that the
continuous-trading solutions will be an asymptotically valid approximation
III
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to the discrete time solution as the trading interval h becomes small. 5 /
Indeed, actual securities markets are open virtually every day, and hence
the assumption that h is small is not without empirical foundation. In
the intertemporal version of the Arrow-Debreu model with complete markets,
it is well known that the market need only be open "once" because indivi-
duals will have no need for further trade. The continuous trading model
is, of course, the opposite extreme. However, the continuous-time model
appears to have many of the properties of the Arrow-Debreu model without
nearly so many securities. Hence, it may be that a good substitute for
having so many markets and securities is to have fewer markets and se-
curities but the existing markets open more frequently. However, the
study of this possibility will be left as a topic for future research.
FOOTNOTES
* This paper is not a survey of the economics and-finance literature on
investment theory which is.already copious.and whose rate of expansion
has in recent years accelerated. Rather the paper-is designed to be
a self-contained, but cryptic, introduction to some of the major problems
in investment theory, In many cases, I have referenced excellent
survey articles which themselves contain extensive bibliographies
rather than attempt to.reference all the important individual contribu-
tions to the subject. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from
the National Science Foundation for this paper.
1. An important issue within this topic is the information efficiency"
of the stock market as derived in Fama [ 13, 14 ] and Samuelson [ 76, 81 ].
Grossman 25] and Grossman and Stiglitz [26] provide some additional
insights. Hirshleifer [36] has shown that, in the absence of production,
private sector expenditures on information gathering-may be "socially
wasteful." Moreover, significant further advances in general equilibrium
theory will require explicit recognition of information production and
its dissemination, and the development of such an integrated theory is
just at its beginning.
2. von Neumann and Morgenstern [91]. For an axiomatic description, see
Herstein and Milnor 3, Although the original axioms require that U
be bounded, the continuity axiom can be extended to.allow for unbounded
functions. See Samuelson 1821 for a discussion of this and the St.
Petersburg Paradox,
3. The strict concavity assumption implies that investors are everywhere
risk-averse. While strictly convex or linear utility functions on the
entire range imply behavior that is grossly at variance with observed
behavior, the strict concavity assumption also rulesout Friedman-
Savage type utility functions whose behavioral implications are reason-
able. The strict concavity also implies U'(W) > 0 which rules out
individual satiation.
4. The "borrowing rate" is the rate on riskless-in-terms-of-default loans.
While virtually every individual loan involves some chance of default,
the empirical "spread" in the rate on margin loans to individuals sug-
gests that this assumption is not a "bad approximation" for portfolio
selection analysis. An explicit analysis of risky loan evaluation is
provided in Section VII.,
5. For a trivial example, shares of General Motors with odd serial numbers
are technically different from shares of GM with even serial numbers,
and are, therefore, technically different securities. However, be-
cause their returns are identical, they are perfect substitutes from
Footnotes 2
the point of view of investors. In portfolio theory, securities are
operationally defined by their return distributions, and therefore two
securities with identical returns are indistinguishable.
6. If U is such that U'(0) = a, and by extension, U'(W)= a, W < 0, then
from (II.2) or (II.4), it is easy to show that the probability of
Z* < 0 is a set of measure zero.
7. Kuhn and Tucker [42]. The analysis of the "'no short-sales" case
is complicated and leads to virtually no theorems. Although in actual
markets there are some restrictions on short sales, these restrictions
may not be too important because limited liability securities (e.g.
put options) can and have been created that provide essentially the
same type of return as a short sale.
8. The behavior associated with the utility function V(W) aU(W) + b,
a > 0, is indistinguishable from the behavior associated with U(W).
9. Pratt [67] Note: A(W) is invariant to any positive
affine transformation of U(W).
10. Rothschild and Stiglitz 73] and [74]. There is an extensive litera-
ture not discussed here that uses this type of risk measure to deter-
mine when one portfolio "stochastically dominates" another. Cf.
Hadar and Russell [27,28 ] and Bawa [ 3].
11. I believe that Christian von Weizsfcker proved a similar theorem in
unpublished notes some years ago. However, I do not have a reference.
12. Because the iso-elastic family is not well defined for W < 0, port-
folios with a positive probability of negative end-of-period wealth
cannot be ranked.
13. Rothschild and Stiglitz [74 , pp. 70-74].
14. For a proof, see Theorem 236 in Hardy, Littlewood, and P81lya [30].
15. A sufficient amount of information would be the joint distribution of
Z* and j. The necessary amount of information will depend upon the func-
tional form of_U'. However, in no case will a necessary condition
be knowledge of Z.
16. Cf. King 41], Livingston [48], Farrar [17], Feeney and Hester P9 ]? Farrell 8 ].
Unlike standard "factor analysis," the number of common factors here
does not depend upon the fraction of total variation in an individual
security's return that can be "explained." Rather what is important
is the number of factors necessary to "explain" the covariation
between pairs of individual securities.
Footnotes 3
17. For this family of utility functions, the probability distribution
for securities cannot be completely arbitrary without violating the
von Neumann-Morgenstern.axioms. For example, it is required that for
every realization of W, W > -a/b for b > 0 and W < -a/b for b < 0.
The latter condition is especially restrictive.
18. Many authors have studied the properties of this family. See Merton
1 54, p389] for references.
19. As discussed in footnote 17, the range of values for a. cannot be
arbitrary for a given b. Moreover, the sign of b uniquely determines
the sign of A'(W).
20. Cass and Stiglitz [ 7 , p. 144].
21. Cf. Ross [72] for spanning proofs in the absence of a riskless se-
curity. Black [4 ] and Merton [55] derive the two-fund theorem for
the mean-variance model with no riskless security.
22. For the Arrow-Debreu model, see Hirshleifer [33 , 34 ,35 ], Myers [66],
and Radner [ 68. For the Mean-Variance model, see Jensen [38 , 39]
and Sharpe [85 ].
23. If the states are defined in terms of end-of-period values of the
firm in addition to "environmental" factors, then the firms' pro-
duction decisions will, in general, alter the state space descrip-
tion which violates the assumptions of the model. Moreover, I see
no obvious reason why individuals are any more likely to agree upon
the {V.(i)} function than upon the probability distributions for
the environmental factors. If sufficient information is available
to partition the states into fine enough categories to produce
agreement on the {V (i)} functions, then, given this information,
it is difficult to imagine how rational individuals would have heter-
ogeneous beliefs about the probability distributions for these
states. As with the standard certainty model, agreement on the
technologies is necessary for pareto optimality in this model.
However, as Peter Diamond has pointed out to me, it is not sufficient.
Sufficiency demands the stronger requirement that everyone be "right"
in their assessment of the technologies.
24. In particular, the optimal portfolio demand functions are of the
form derived in the proof of Theorem IV.9. For a complete analytic
derivation, see Merton [55].
25. Sharpe [84], Lintner [47], and Mossin [65] are generally credited
with independent derivations of the model. Black [ 4] extended the
model to include the case of no riskless security.
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26. Cf. Borch [ 6], Feldstein [20], robin [90], and Samuelson [77].
27. Radner [68, p. 460].
28. By this assumption, I have formally ruled out financial securities
that alter the tax liabilities of the firm (e.g., interest deduc-
tions) or ones that can induce "outside" costs (e.g., bankruptcy
costs). However, by redefining V (I.;O.) as the pre-tax and bankruptcy
value of the firm and letting oneJofJth! fk represent the government's
(tax) claim and another the lawyers' (bankruptcy) claim, then the
analysis in the text will be valid for these extended securities as
well.
29. Miller and Modigliani [64]. See also Stiglitz [87] and
Miller [63].
30. The additivity of the utility function and the single-consumption-good
assumptions are made for analytical simplicity and because the prin-
ciple topic of this paper is investment allocation and not the indivi-
dual consumption choice. Fama [15] analyzes the problem for non-additive
utilities. Although T is treated as known in the text, the analysis
is essentially the same for an uncertain lifetime with T a random
variable. Cf. IRichard [70] and Merton [54].
31. This definition of a riskless security is purely technical and without
normative significance. For example, investing solely in the riskless
security will not allow for a certain consumption stream because R(t)
will vary stochastically over time. On the other hand, a T-period,
riskless-in-terms-of-default coupon bond which allows for a certain con-
sumption stream is not a riskless security because its one-period
return is uncertain. For further discussion, see Merton [57].
32. It is assumed that all income comes from investment in securities.
The analysis would be the same with wage income provided that
investors can sell shares against future income. However, because
institutionally this cannot be done, the "nonmarketability" of wage
income will cause systematic effects on the portfolio and consumption
decisions.
33. Many non-Markov stochastic processes can be transformed to fit the
Markov format by expanding the number of state variables. Cf. Cox
and Miller [ 8, pp. 16-18]. To avoid including "surplus" state
variables, it is assumed that {S(t)} represent the minimum number of
variables necessary to make j.(t+l)}Markov.
J
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34. Sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of the solutions
are: (1) strict concavity of U and B; (2) no redundant securities;
(3) no arbitrage opportunities. Cf. Dreyfus [11] for the dynamic
programming technique.
35. See Fama [15] for a general discussion of these conditions.
36. See Latand [44], Markowitz [50], and Rubinstein [75] for arguments
in favor of this view, and Samuelson [80], Goldman [24], and Merton
and Samuelson [ 6] for arguments in opposition to this view.
37. This digression is adapted from Merton [58, pp. 662-663].
38. If investor behavior were invariant to h, then investors
would choose the same portfolio if . they were "frozen" into
their investments for ten years as they would if they could revise
their portfolios every day.
39. See Feller [21]; It6 and McKean [37], and Cox and Miller [ 8].
40. (VII.9) is a short-hand expression for the stochastic integral
t t
Si(t) = Si(O) + f Gi(S,T)dT + f Hi(S,T)dqi0 0
where S(t) is the solution to (VII.9) with probability one. For a
general discussion and proofs, see Arnold [ 1], It8 and McKean [37],
McKean [51], and McShane [52].
41. ft dq = q (t) - q (0) will be normally distributed with a zero mean
and variance equal o t.
42. See Feller [21, pp. 320-321]; Cox and Miller [ 8, p. 215]. The transi-
tion probabilities will satisfy the Kolmogrov or Fokker-Planck partial
differential equations.
43. Merton [54, p. 377]. dP /P. in continuous time corresponds to Z(t+l) - 1
in the discrete-time analysis.
44. r(t) corresponds to R(t) - 1 in the discrete-time analysis, and is the
"force of interest," continuous rate. While the rate earned between
t and (t+dt), r(t),is known with certainty as of time t, r(t) can vary
stochastically over time.
45. Unlike in the Arrow-Debreu model, for example, it is not assumed here
that the returns are necessarily completely described by the changes
in the state variables, dSi, i=l, . .. , m. I.e., the dZ need not be
instantaneously perfectly correlated with some linear combination of
dq, . . d, q . Rather it is only assumed that (dP1/P1, . . ., dP /P,'dSi,
., dS) is-Markov in S(t).
m
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Footnotes 6
46. See Merton [54, p. 381] and Kushner [43, Chapter IV, Theorem 7].
47. See Merton [54, p. 384-488]. It is also shown there that the return
will be lognormal on the risky fund which, together with the riskless
security, spans the efficient portfolio set.
48. This case is similar in spirit to the Arrow-Debreu complete markets
model.
49. This behavior will obtain even when the return on fund #(2+i) is not
instantaneously perfectly correlated with dSi..
50. For further discussion of this analysis, descriptions of specific
sources of uncertainty, and extensions to discrete-time examples, see
Merton [57, 58, 59]. In the case of multiple consumption goods with
uncertain relative prices, similar behavior obtains. However C* is a
vector and J is the "shadow" price of the "composite" consumption
bundle. Hence, the corresponding derived "hedging" behavior is to
minimize the unanticipated variations in JW
51. (VII.24) is2a linear partial differential equation of the parabolic
type. If a is a continuous function and g is piece-wise continuous,
then there exists a unique solution that satisfies boundary conditions
(VII.25). The usual method for solving this equation is Fourier
transforms.
52. It6's Lemma is for stochastic differentiation the analog to the Funda-
mental Theorem of the calculus for deterministic differentiation. For
a statement of the Lemma and applications in economics, see Merton [54,
56 ]. For its rigorous proof, see McKean [51, p. 44].
53. For a proof and extensions to general contingent claim securities,
see Merton [60].
54. The literature based on the Black-Scholes type analysis has grown so
rapidly that no attempt has been made here to provide a complete set of
references. An excellent survey article is Smith [86]. In addition to
the pricing of corporate liabilities, it has been applied to the pric-
ing of loan guarantees, insurance contracts, "dual" funds, term-structure
bonds, and even tenure for university professors.
55. See Samuelson [79] and Merton and Samuelson [61]. In Merton [58, p. 663]
there is a brief discussion of the special cases in which the limiting
discrete-time solutions do not approach the continuous-time solutions.
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